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Introduction**
In 1981, California became the first American state to adopt an "interest on lawyers' trust account" 1 program by legislation.2 It requires
California attorneys to invest designated principal sums owned by their
** Sources cited in this Note are available at the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly
Office.
1. "Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account" ("IOLTA") programs permit or require attorneys to invest their clients' trust funds so that the income generated will benefit public interest
legal services projects. See Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, Financing Public Services Activities
With Interest-BearingAttorney Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHO L. Rv. 219, 220 n.3 (1979). A
recent law review article traces the phrase to the Florida Supreme Court opinion that implemented the first American program: In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 389
(Fla. 1981). See Baker & Wood, "Taking" a ConstitutionalLook at the State Bar of Texas
Proposalto Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEx. TECH L. REv. 327, 329
n.15 (1983).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1985). As of January 15, 1985,
35 states had approved IOLTA programs by either supreme court order or legislation. 2
IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 1, 8-12. Thirty states implemented the programs by
supreme court order; the following list indicates the chronology of these court actions: In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. July 16, 1981); Idaho Sup. Ct. Order (May
27, 1982); Colo. Sup. Ct. Order (Nov. 1, 1982); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d
1258 (N.H. Nov. 24, 1982); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Dec. 27,
1982); Or. Sup. Ct. Order (Feb. 1, 1983); Nev. Sup. Ct. Order (Mar. 4, 1983); Va. Sup. Ct.
Order (Mar. 30, 1983); Ill.
Sup. Ct. Order (Apr. 29, 1983); Okla. Sup. Ct. Order (May 23,
1983); N.C. Sup. Ct. Order (June 23, 1983); Hawaii Sup. Ct. Order (Sept. 22, 1983); Del. Sup.
Ct. Order (Sept. 29, 1983); Vt. Sup. Ct. Order (Oct. 18, 1983); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d 406 (Utah Oct. 25, 1983); Ga. Sup. Ct. Order (Nov. 4, 1983); S.D. Sup. Ct.
Order (Jan. 5, 1984); Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order (Jan. 11, 1984); Kan. Sup. Ct. Order (Apr. 5, 1984);
Tex. Sup. Ct. Order (May 9, 1984); Neb. Sup. Ct. Order (May 15, 1984); Miss. Sup. Ct. Order
(May 30, 1984); Wash. Sup. Ct. Opinion (June 19, 1984); N.M. Sup. Ct. Order (July 18, 1984);
In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 283 Ark. 252, 675 S.W.2d 355 (Sept. 17, 1984),
modifying 279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W.2d 480 (1983); Mo. Sup. Ct. Order (Oct. 23, 1984); Tenn. Sup.
Ct. Order (Oct. 30, 1984); R.I. Sup. Ct. Order (Nov. 21, 1984); Iowa Sup. Ct. Opinion (Dec.
28, 1984); and La. Sup. Ct. Order (Jan. 14, 1985). 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1984, at 10-13;
2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 8-12.
Four states in addition to California implemented IOLTA programs by legislation: MD.
ANN. CODE art. 10 § 44(a)(2) (July 1, 1982); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (Consol. 1983); 1984
CONN. ACTS 537 (Reg. Sess.) (June 15, 1984); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09 (Page

1985).
In general, the branch of state government that regulates the legal profession implements
trust account programs. Minnesota Developments: Minnesota's New Interest On Lawyer Trust
Accounts Program, 67 MINN. L. Rlv. 1286, 1291 (1983).
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clients in interest-bearing accounts.3 Financial institutions then forward
the resulting income to the State Bar of California for disbursal to legal
aid programs and support centers that service indigents.4
In the past, attorneys and law firms rarely invested client trust

funds. The traditional trust account practice was to commingle numer-

ous clients' principal sums into single, non-interest-bearing accounts. 5
Since financial institutions across the state paid no interest on these accounts, they benefitted from attorneys' trust account practices. The
practical impact of California's "Legal Services Trust Account Program"

("the Program") is to shift this substantial benefit from the banks to legal
aid centers that service the impoverished. Although the media heralded
the legislation as "almost too good to be true,",6 attorneys across the state
have opposed its implementation. 7 They contend that by taking the interest earnings, the Program "takes" their clients' property in violation
of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-

stitution.8 In two lawsuits filed in 1983, 9 California plaintiffs attacked

3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6211-6212 (West Supp. 1985); see generally Murray,
Old Problem, New Solution: FundingLegal Services, 3 CAL. LAW., June 1983, at 26, 27.
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6211(a), 6216 (West Supp. 1985).
5. See infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
6. Lawyers iescue Legal Aid Plan, San Francisco Chron., March 21, 1983, at 34, col. 1.
7. Declaration of Bruce Hamilton at 2, Petition For Extraordinary Relief In The Nature
of Prohibition; Request For Temporary Stay; With Supporting Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at app. C, The State Bar of California v. Superior Court of the State of California
for County of San Diego, No. LA31749 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
State Bar Petition].
8. See, eg., Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction; Points and Authorities at 4-5, Seuthe v. State Bar of California, No. C455587 (Los
Angeles Sup. Ct. filed June 6, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Seuthe Summary Judgment] (plaintiff
attorneys challenging consitutionality of California program on Fifth Amendment grounds);
see also I IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1983, at 5. Cf. Rivlin, I O.LTA. Gains Momentum
Nationwide, 69 A.B.A. J. 1036, 1040 (1983) ("It is generally agreed among proponents and
opponents [of trust account programs] that the issue of taking will most likely be resolved
ultimately by the United States Supreme Court.").
9. Carroll v. State Bar of California, No. N22139 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed Mar. 16,
1983); Seuthe v. State Bar of California, No. C455587 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed June 6,
1983). See 1 IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1983, at 5. Ultimately, these cases were consolidated
in the San Diego Superior court. See Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094,
209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984). They were the first legal challenges to an IOLTA program in the
country. See 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 1. A Florida plaintiff fied a $20 million
class action in the United States District Court in Tampa, Florida challenging Florida's plan
on October 11, 1984. See Due Process Violation Alleged: FloridaSuit ChallengesIOLTA Plan's
Legality, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 10, col. 3; see generally Allen, Where's the Interest?, 5
CAL. LAw, Feb. 1985, at 8. Five Iowa attorneys filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the
United States Supreme Court on March 14, 1985. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Spring 1985, at 12. The
Court denied the petition on May 13, 1985. 3 IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1985, at 4.
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the Program's constitutionality on this basis.1 0 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal, however, rejected these contentions on December 19,
1984, in Carrollv. State Bar of California."
This Note explores the historical background of the Program and
describes it in detail. It then analyzes the Fifth Amendment Taking
Clause issue as it has been presented in the California litigation. Finally,
the Note concludes that California's Program may be unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny in future litigation. 2

I.
A.

The California Legal Services Trust Account Program

Historical Background: The Florida Plan

The concept of using interest earned on clients' trust funds is novel
in the United States, but has been common in other countries since the
1960's. 3 The Florida Bar conducted an extensive five-year study of the
foreign programs and designed a similar plan for implementation in Florida.14 In a landmark 1978 opinion, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
10. See supra note 8; see also Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Mandate; Complaint for
Declaratory Relief at 2-5, Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Carroll Complaint].
Plaintiffs have also attacked the Program on the following additional bases: that it constitutes a selective and discriminatory tax; that it deprives clients of due process of law; that it
denies clients the equal protection of the laws; and that it is unconstitutionally vague. See
Carroll Complaint at 2-3; Seuthe Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 14-15. The Fifth
Amendment challenge is the most substantial. See Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 353.
11. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
12. Plaintiffs in Carrollpetitioned the California Supreme Court for a hearing on January
3, 1985. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 1, 6. However, because they had stipulated to a
remittitur under California Rule of Court 25(b), plaintiffs' appeal was not filed timely. See In
the Supreme Court of the State of California In Bank, 4 Civ. No. 31635 (Sup. Ct. Order filed
Mar. 14, 1985), Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Order]. The California Supreme Court denied
plaintiffs' petition on May 2, 1985. Order Denying Hearing After Judgment by the Court of
Appeal, 4th District, Division 1, No. D001363, Civil 31635 In the Supreme Court of the State
of California In Bank, Carroll v. The State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (1984); see 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Spring 1985, 1. Plaintiffs are expected to file a writ of
certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. San Francisco Daily Recorder, May 3,
1985, at 1, col. 1. For a discussion of Carroll,see infra notes 199-222 and accompanying text.
13. The Australian state of Victoria was the first common law jurisdiction to adopt a
program that used interest generated on client trust funds to benefit public service law projects;
its Parliament first gave the idea serious consideration in 1963. Comment, A Source ofRevenue
for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part . An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries
and FloridaAllowing the Use of Clients' FundsHeld by Attorneys in Non-Interest-BearingTrust
Accounts to Support Programsof the OrganizedBar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 543 (1979). Programs are in operation in at least sixteen other foreign jurisdictions, including several Canadian provinces. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 803 n.25 (Fla. 1978); see
generally Comment, supra at 542-50. See also Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 329.
14. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 799-800; see Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 329.
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the Bar's proposal."
The Florida Bar's success spawned similar programs nationwide.1 6
As of January 15, 1985, thirty-five programs had been approved and seventeen of those have since become operational. 7 Thus, Florida's plan
and the basis of the Florida court's approval are critical to understanding
California's
Program as well as trust account programs across the
18
country.
The Florida plan is based upon the historical attorney practice of
commingling numerous clients' trust funds into a single non-interestbearing checking account.1 9 In In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 20 the
Florida court described several factors that contributed to this non-investment practice. The primary reason was that demand deposit investment accounts were illegal.21 Since attorneys' strict ethical obligations to
maintain client trust funds include keeping them readily available for delivery,22 the funds could not be invested without breaching this professional duty.2 3 The initial Florida plan used trust savings accounts to
comport with the banking restrictions.2 4 The funds would then be
shifted into checking accounts for prompt delivery to clients on
demand.2 5
15. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 799, 800, 807.
16. See In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 283 Ark. 252, 253, 675 S.W.2d 355,
356 (1984), modifying 279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W. 2d 480 (1983); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 406-08 (Utah 1983); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d
151,156-57 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 972, 975-76, 453 A.2d
1258, 1259, 1261 (1982). See generally Rivlin, supra note 8.
17. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 1, 8. The programs became operational on the
dates listed: Fla. (Sept. 1, 1981); N.H. (Jan. 1, 1983); Cal. (Mar. 1, 1983); Md. (Mar. 25, 1983);
Colo. (Apr. 1, 1983); Del. (May 26, 1983); Minn. (July 1, 1983); Ill. (Sept. 1, 1983); Va. (Sept.
1, 1983); Or. (Nov. 1, 1983); Idaho (Jan. 1, 1984); N.C. (Apr. 1, 1984); Okla. (May 26, 1984);
Utah (July 1, 1984); Vt. (Sept. 1, 1984); Ariz. (Oct. 30, 1984); and Kan. (Nov. 1, 1984). Id. at
8-11.
18. A national clearinghouse has been established to process information on IOLTA programs and also to provide states with data, materials, training, and technical assistance on
IOLTA program design and operation. I IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1983, at 1. Funds for the
clearinghouse are provided by the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"). Id. Trust account
programs are viewed as a solution to recent funding cutbacks to the LSC. See Murray, supra
note 3, at 26-27.
19. See In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 801-02; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982), reprintedin 68 A.B.A. J. 1502, 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA Op. 348].
20. 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
21. Id. at 801-02, 802 n.19. At the time of this 1978 opinion, federal law prohibited the
earning of interest on checking accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1945) (amended 1980).
22. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1981); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983); CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8101 (1977). See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 541-42.
23. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 800-02.
24. Id. at 802-03, 803 n.24.
25. See id.
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Another factor contributing to the non-investment practice was that
attorneys lacked "any personalfinancialincentive to make clients' funds
productive., 26 Although the court did not explain this statement, it indicated that attorneys may lack investment incentive because of administrative expense.2 7 Since attorneys' obligations as trustees do not
generally include the duty to make clients' funds productive, 28 attorneys
could effectively fulfill their legal responsibilities through the less expensive commingled non-interest-bearing account system.
The final factor was the "complex and expensive" accounting problem that would result from investing the funds and apportioning the interest earned.2 9 Opening a separate account for each individual client
would be "highly impractical." 3 But the less costly commingled account system made it "exceedingly difficult, ifnot impossible, to apportion
the interest. . . among the respective clients."31 Although the Florida
court acknowledged that accounting problems had "long been resolved"
by computer technology,32 this impracticability notion was critical to its
initial approval of the program.33
For these reasons, attorneys have commingled numerous clients'
funds in single non-interest-bearing accounts. As a result, financial institutions have enjoyed a substantial monetary benefit. 34 The Florida plan
and the similar programs modeled after it nationwide seek to shift the
benefit from the banks to public interest legal programs. The crucial
point for constitutional purposes is that theoretically, the plan removes
obstacles to investment but does not eliminate practical difficulties that
prevent the investment of clients' funds to benefit clients.35
The Florida plan changed substantially 36 after it was first approved
26. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
27. Attorneys would encounter "expensive accounting problems." Id.
28. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1981). See also infra
notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
29. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 801.
30. Id. at 801 n.18.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 803; cf. Hammond, Interest on Solicitors' Trust Accounts: A New Force in the
Public Interest?, 1984 N.Z.L.J. 26. (argument that it is impracticable to calculate separate
interest on clients' funds after they have been commingled "of course does not, today, make
much economic sense, neither does it recognise the capabilities of modern computerised subaccounting facilities").
33. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 806 ("The general characterization of the Bar's proposal
as a mechanism by which money properly belonging to clients will be improperly diverted...
ignores ... [that] for practical reasons [the money] cannot be made available to them.").
34. Id. at 802.
35. See infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
36. Compare In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 807-11 with In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 396-98.
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in 1978.1 7 These changes and the forces that precipitated them are significant to the constitutional dilemma that faced California's Program.
The first major change eliminated disclosure and client consent.
The initial Florida plan included a form notice that described the program and advised clients to withdraw if they did not wish their funds
used in the plan.3" Although commentators questioned its sufficiency, 9
the form notice did provide this most basic procedural due process requirement. 4 Additionally, clients could control whether their principal
funds were used. By approving the investment, clients waived their constitutional right to the income; implicit in the court's notice requirement is the concept that clients have a property interest in the earnings
generated on their principal sums.
But the plan clashed with Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") policies
regarding the "assignment of income." 42 The Florida Bar determined
that the plan's success depended on the ability to tax the Bar rather than
the clients for income generated by the plan.4 3 Three years of negotiations with the IRS were unavailing;' the IRS determined that although
the plan was not an income-shifting scheme, it would serve as precedent
which could be used for that purpose. 45 The IRS only agreed to tax the
37. Although Florida's IOLTA plan was first approved in 1978, In re Interest, 402 So. 2d
at 389, Florida's plan was not adopted until July 16, 1981, id., and it did not become operational until September 1, 1981. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 8.
38. In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 810-11.
39. Comment, supra note 13, at 556-59 (cautioning that the form notice did not provide
enough information either to fulfill basic due process requirements or to allow clients to waive
their constitutional property rights to the interest income).
40. See, eg.,.Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1950)
("Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of...
property. . . be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing .... ");Goldwin v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 638, 662, 592 P.2d 289, 304-05, 153 Cal. Rptr. 802, 817-18 (1979)
(citing Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 458, 535 P.2d 713, 719, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585, 591 (1975) ("[The basic proposition [is] that in every case involving a deprivation of
property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of

notice and hearing.")).
41. But cf. Comment, supra note 13, at 556-59.

42. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719, 719 (Fla. 1981).
The "assignment of income" doctrine was first articulated in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930). It prevents taxpayers from shifting their income to others in order to lower their marginal tax brackets and thus pay lower taxes. See In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 390-91.
43. In re Interest,402 So. 2d at 391. Although the Florida court did not explain the Bar's
reasoning, id., it is linked to administrative expense for attorneys. Brief for Amici Curiae in
Support of the State Bar of California and Intervenors at 6-8, Carroll v. State Bar of California,
162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984). Attorneys would spend time obtaining their
clients' tax information and preparing Internal Revenue Service forms. Id. at 6-7. According
to Program proponents, this added administrative expense would make IOLTA plans impracticable. See infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
44. See In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 390-91.
45. Id. at 390-91.
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Bar rather than the individual clients whose funds composed the accounts if "clients could in no way and to no degree control the4 creation
6
or destiny of earnings generated on their attorney-held funds."
The Florida Supreme Court responded to the IRS position by eliminating the notice and withdrawal provisions of the original 1978 plan.47
The court concluded that no notice was required because the clients did
not have a property interest in the earnings generated on their principal
sums. 48 The Florida court's conclusion was essential to its finding of
constitutionality, since the basic due process requirements of notice and
an opportunity to be heard must be fulfilled when a recognizable property interest is affected.49 Its reasoning, however, is less than persuasive, 5° especially given its earlier requirement that clients consent to the
use of their principal sums.
Another major change that occurred between 1978 and the Florida
court's final implementing opinion in 1981 was the court's emphasis on
client funds that are "nominal in amount or to be held for a short period
of time."5 1 Although its 1978 opinion briefly mentioned this standard,52
the court did not require that only these funds be invested under the
plan. But its 1981 opinion specifically restricted the plan to nominal or
short term trust funds. 3 The change is linked to two factors. First, the
IRS restrictions eliminated client notice and control. 4 The Florida Bar
asked the court to reaffirm the nominal or short term standard to comport with these IRS restrictions.55 The result is new reasoning that clients have no property rights since interest earned on nominal or short
term principal sums is too small to constitute a benefit. 6
Second, the United States Supreme Court decided Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith57 in the interim period. In Webb's, a Florida county took interest earned on a privately owned interpleader fund.5 8
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the practice by construing a Florida
statute to vest ownership of the interest in the county.59 But the United
46. Id. at 391.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 395-96.
49. See supra note 40.

50. See infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
51. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 397.

52. See In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 802 n.20, 804.
53. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 397. The court, however, does not view this as a change.

It states that its 1978 plan "contemplated precisely" the same standards. Id. at 390.
54. Id. at 390-91.
55. Id. at 391.
56. See id. at 395-96.
57. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). For more detailed discussions of Webb's, see infra notes 173-96,
304-18 and accompanying text.
58. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155-56.
59. See id. at 158-59.
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States Supreme Court overruled Florida and held that this practice violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' In its 1981 trust account
decision, the Florida court distinguished Webb's. It reasoned that since
interest earned on nominal or short term principal funds was not "property" belonging to clients, the Supreme Court's decision did not conflict
with the plan.6 1 Therefore, Florida's 1981 implementing opinion restricts the plan's operation to client principal sums which are either nominal in amount or which are to be held by the attorney for a short
duration.6 2
The final major change that occurred following the court's 1978
opinion was that interest-bearing demand deposit accounts became available nationwide.63 This change prompted the Florida Bar to ask the
Florida Supreme Court to require attorneys' participation in the planf'
Apparently, the original plan was voluntary because it burdened attorneys with shifting client trust funds from savings to checking accounts.65
But the Bar's request to make the plan mandatory brought a response
' 66
from Florida attorneys described as a "brouhaha
ranging from "re'67
outrage.
hyperbolic
to
disagreement
spectful
In partial deference to the vehement response it received to the proposal, the court rejected the mandatory plan. 68 But the most important
reason it rejected the mandatory plan is linked to Webb's. The court
stated: "Webb's. . .obviously cannot be ignored in framing any program involving a state-directed use of income generated on private
60. Id. at 164-65.
61. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 395.
62. Id. at 397.
63. In re Interest, 396 So. 2d at 719; see generally, Schley, Restriction on Ownership of
NOWAccounts, 99 BANKING L.J. 196, 200-06 (1982).
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal ("NOW") accounts may only be used "with respect to
deposits or accounts which consist solely of funds in which the entire beneficial interest is held
by one or more individuals or by an organization which is operated primarily for religious,
philanthropic, charitable, educational, or other similar purposes and which is not operated for
profit." 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Corporations, partnerships and other profitmaking organizations cannot invest in NOW accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2); 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.157 (1985). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued an opinion to
the Florida Bar that the "entire beneficial interest" to earnings under the program belonged to
the Florida Bar Foundation. Letter from Michael Bradfield to Donald M. Middlebrooks (October 15, 1981), reprintedin Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program-Mechanics
of its Operation, 56 FLA. B.J. 115, 117 (1982); see, e.g., Minnesota Developments, supra note 2, at
1289 n.15. For a critical discussion of the Board of Governors' opinion, see Baker & Wood,
supra note 1, at 335 n.39.
64. See In re Interest, 396 So. 2d at 720.
65. See In re Interest, 356 So. 2d at 804; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
66. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 391.
67. Id.
68. "We cannot ignore the response of our bar. Indeed, we requested comments. ...
Id. at 392.
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funds."' 69 Therefore, the Florida court may have retained the voluntary
attorney program to attenuate any claim of state action by Florida in
potential due process challenges to the plan. 70 The court's statement
demonstrates implicit concern about the the program's constitutionality.
The Florida plan became operational on September 1, 1981.71 Attorney participation is completely voluntary, apparently to avert constitutional challenges based upon Webb'S. 72 It has no provision for
notifying clients that their funds are being invested and does not allow
clients to control whether or not their funds are used.7 3 It applies only to
principal sums of either nominal amount or which are to be held for
short time periods, because interest earned on these funds is too small to
constitute clients' "property."'7 4 The court stated: "If we have failed in
any constitutional. . . sense to resolve the obstacles to implementation,
and we do not believe that we have, it appears to us that we have done
our best and should end our labors here." 75 Unfortunately, the plan and
others like it became operational without a comprehensive resolution of
the constitutional issues in an adversarial proceeding.7 6 Since California's Program is based on the final Florida plan, the problems that first
69. Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
See Oral Argument by Arthur J. England, Jr. Chief Justice, 1978-1980, Supreme Court of
Florida, reprinted in England, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (Apr.
1983). England wrote both Florida IOLTA opinions, In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So.
2d 799 (Fla. 1978); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981), and participated in the Florida Supreme Court opinion overruled in Webb's. Beckwith v. Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). In a hypothetical oral argument supporting IOLTA programs, he argues that "[t]he second distinguishing feature from Webb's is the absence of any state's compulsion, that is a 'taking' .... 1"
England, supra, at 24. He indicates that voluntary attorney programs do not compel the assignment of clients' earnings to a state-directed purpose. Id.
70. A recent law review article criticized this notion. See Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at
337-39. Although the state may not be responsible for the private actions of attorneys in a
voluntary program, it has enacted a rule which it then encourages and facilitates. Id. at 338.
Any one of these rules may be sufficient state action to allow a constitutional challenge under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
The state action issue was not raised in the California litigation, and was not discussed in
Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984). The State
Bar of California is a public corporation created pursuant to Article VI, Section 9, of California's Constitution. In addition, the Program itself is an act of the legislature. See infra note 77
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the state action in the procedural due process
context, see Comment, A Critiqueof Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts Programs,44 LA. L.
REv. 999, 1026-29 (1984).
71. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 396-97; see also supra note 37.
72. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
75. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 393.
76. See Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 336 ("[Constitutional] issues largely have been
overlooked in other jurisdictions and we are concerned that Texas should not follow similar
shortcuts."). See infra note 139.
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arose in Florida were finally adjudicated in an adversarial context in the
California courts.
B.

The Statute

California's Program was the first plan created by legislation.77 The
Governor signed it into law on September 25, 1981,78 just weeks after
Florida's plan became operational.7 9 The statute prevented the program
from operating until the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California adopted regulations.8 0 It was not until after the Board completed this
process in January of 1983,81 that attorneys across the state were notified

of the new Program. 2

All attorneys in California who hold client trust funds are compelled
to participate. Section 621 l(a) of the California Business and Professions
Code states specifically that these attorneys "shall establish and maintain
an interest bearing demand trust account."8 3 This mandatory feature of
the Program distinguishes it from most of the plans in the country,8 4 and
may have played a role in the constitutional challenges to its validity.8
Plaintiffs filed the first California lawsuit only two weeks after attorneys

.2.

77. Four other states have established trust account programs legislatively. See supra note

78. State Bar Petition, supra note 7, at 8.
79. See supra text accompanying note 76.
80. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6226 (West Supp. 1985).
81. State Bar Petition, supra, note 7, at 16.
82. During the last week of February 1983, the State Bar of California mailed a packet of
materials to approximately 79,000 bar members. Id. at 20. It included a letter from State Bar
President Anthony Murray describing the Program, and a booklet containing the statute, the
approved regulations and a set of instructions. The final item in the packets was an attorney
compliance statement which all attorneys were required to return to the Bar with proof that
they had opened interest-bearing trust fund accounts. Id. See THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, LEGAL SERVICES TRUST FUND PROGRAM: GUIDELINES, STATUTE AND REGULATING
RULES 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES]. By the

end of March 1983, over 16,000 attorneys had responded, with nearly 4,200 opening the accounts. State Bar Petition, supra note 7, at 20.
83. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
84. Only California, Minnesota, Arizona, Washington, Iowa and Ohio have approved
mandatory trust account programs. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 8-12. The remaining
29 states approved programs that are voluntary on the part of attorneys. Id. Several states have
adopted "opt-out" programs that require participation unless an attorney voluntarily declines.
See IIOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1984, at 1. Delaware, Utah, and Rhode Island use this participation method. 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 8-12.
85. Cf.In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1981) ("Quite obviously, the Foundation's proposal has struck a nerve in the legal profession, and the focus of the
pain is the mandatory nature of the proposal. The original idea of creating a [voluntary] program.

. .

brought some negative views, but no comparable outcry.

.. ").
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were notified of the Program, 86 and the second suit was filed by attorneys
seeking plaintiff class action status for other similarly situated
attorneys.8 7
Attorneys must open the interest bearing accounts in financial institutions "authorized by the Supreme Court., 88 As of July 1983, over 800
banks and savings and loans in California offered the authorized account.8 9 In practical effect, this provision forced attorneys who kept
their clients' funds in unauthorized banks to change banks in the three
month period between March 1, 1983 and May 31, 1983.90
The statute compels attorneys to invest their clients' funds in two
different situations. Under Section 621 l(a), attorneys must invest clients'
funds that are "nominal in amount or are on deposit for a short period of
time" to earn interest for the State Bar of California.9 1 Under Section
6211 (b), attorneys may invest clients' funds to benefit clients, but only if
the funds are "not deposited in accordance with subdivision (a)."9 2 Regulations explain that nominal or short-term funds are those that the attorney determines are "not practical to segregate. . . to earn income for
the benefit of the client in the light of the income the funds could earn or
93
the costs involved in earning or accounting for any such income.,
Thus, attorneys must make this initial practical determination about
each client's funds. If an attorney believes in good faith94 that a client's
funds cannot practically be invested to benefit the owner, then that attor86. Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Mandate; Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984); see supra note
82.
87. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions at 1-2,
Seuthe v. State Bar of California, No. C455587 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed June 6, 1983).
88. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6212(a) (West Supp. 1985).
89. 1 IOLTA UPDATE, Summer 1983, at 5.
90. See THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 82 at 3. The Carroll
lawsuit, filed on March 16, 1983, included a declaration stating that plaintiff's attorney "would
be forced to open a new account in a different bank." Declaration of Elizabeth Carroll at 2,
Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
91. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211(a) (West Supp. 1985).

The trial court in Carroll concluded that clients could choose whether their nominal or
short-term funds were invested to benefit the clients or perhaps other charities. Judgment at 3,
Carroll v. State Bar, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740; see State Bar Leaders Assert
Trust Fund 'Intact'After Ruling; Legal Aid Money, Los Angeles Daily Recorder, Nov. 21,
1983, at 1, col. 2. The court of appeal rejected this construction of § 6211 (a). Carroll,162 Cal.
App. 3d at 1102, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211(b) (West Supp. 1985); see Carroll,162 Cal. App. 3d at
1101, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 744 ("We hold subdivision (b) plainly applies only to monies not nominal in amount or deposited for short term, i.e., to funds which may be segregated to earn net
income for benefit of a client." (emphasis in original)).
93. Regulating Rule 1.4, reprinted in THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES,
supra note 82, at 14.
94. See Regulating Rule 1.5, reprintedin THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES,

supra note 82, at 14.
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ney must invest the funds in a Section 6211(a) account to benefit the
Program. If, however, the attorney believes investment could benefit the
client, then that attorney must invest the funds in either a Section
621 l(b) account or "as the client directs in writing."'9 5 In practical effect,
these sections abrogate attorneys' option to maintain clients' funds in
a dramatic shift
non-interest-bearing accounts. The Program is therefore 96
from the historical attorney practice of non-investment.
Financial institutions remit interest generated on the Section
6211(a) nominal or short-term accounts to the State Bar of California
directly; 97 attorneys play no part in calculating or accounting for the
interest. The institution computes the earnings for each account and
subtracts "reasonable" 98 service charges. It must forward the interest to
the State Bar at least quarterly,99 and include a detailed accounting statement. 1°° The attorney or law firm also receives a copy of the statement. 1 Although the financial institutions must not pay less interest on
trust fund accounts than they pay on comparable accounts, 10 2 they maintain discretion in setting "reasonable" service fees. Therefore, the
amount of interest generated per account depends not only on the total
value of the clients' commingled sums, but also on the expenses charged
by the particular financial institution.
The rest of the statute details how interest earnings are disbursed
under the Program. Section 6210 expresses the purposes of the article as
"to expand the availability and improve the quality of existing free legal
services in civil matters to indigent persons, and to initiate new programs
that will provide services to them." 10 3 After subtracting the Bar's administrative expenses, eighty-five percent of the remaining balance funds
non-profit "qualified legal service projects" that service the poor,"° and
fifteen percent funds "qualified support centers" that train and assist
legal services projects employees. 10 5 Census figures on indigency are
used as part of a formula to distribute the funds pro-rata on a county by
county basis.10 6 The State Bar of California distributed funds for the first
time on March 4, 1985.107
95. Regulating Rule 1.4, supra note 93, at 14.
96. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212(c)) (West Supp. 1985).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at § 6212(c)(2).
101. Id. at § 6212(c)(3).
102. Id. at § 6212(b).
103. Id. at § 6210.
104. Id. at §§ 6216(b), 6213(a).
105. Id. at §§ 6216(c), 6213(b).
106. Id. at § 6216(b).
107. Trust Account Funds Released, CAL. LAW., April 1985, at 65. Interview with Leroy
Cordova, Director, California Legal Services Trust Fund Program (Mar. 25, 1985).
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C. Current Status of the Program
Plaintiffs challenged the California Program in two lawsuits filed
March 16, 1983 and June 6, 1983.108 The State Bar of California immediately petitioned the California Supreme Court for extraordinary relief.10 9 It asked the supreme court to stay the trial court proceedings and
prayed that the court determine the merits of the constitutional challenges. 1 But the California Supreme Court refused relief.11 1
In an order filed December 20, 1983,112 the trial court in Carrollv.
State Bar of California,'13 anomalously sustained the Program: it construed the Program as constitutional and yet granted plaintiffs' motions
for summary judgment as if the Program were unconstitutional.1 14 It
decided that clients have "the right to choose" whether their sums are
invested to benefit the Bar under a Section 6211(a) account or are invested with the interest payable to them under a Section 6211(b) account. 11 5 This procedure would satisfy the basic procedural due process
requirement of notice, and the clients' control could reasonably constitute a waiver of clients' Fifth Amendment rights when the funds were
invested to benefit the Bar.' 16 However, the appellate court promptly
rejected the trial court's analysis. Not only did "clear and unambiguous" 117 statutory language eliminate client control, but IRS policy compelled its elimination. 1 ' In addition, legislative history demonstrated
that legislators intended to eliminate clients' optional participation, unless the funds could be invested for the clients' benefit.' 9 The court of
appeal admonished that the court "should not rewrite legislation' 12to
avoid
0
constitutional questions if doing so subverts legislative intent."
The Carroll court also analyzed the history of trust account programs, 12 as well as several constitutional issues.122 It concluded that the
108. See supra note 9.
109. See State Bar Petition, supra note 7.
110. Id. at 7-8.
111. Order of the California Supreme Court, The State Bar of California v. Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of San Diego, No. LA31749 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Apr.
18, 1983).
112. Judgment, supra note 91, at 1.
113. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
114. Judgment, supra note 91, at 3-4.
115. Id. at 3; see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.

117. Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1101, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
118. Id. at 1102, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 745. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
119. Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1102, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
120. Id. (citing Marina Village v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 388, 393, 132 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (1976)).
121. Id. at 1099-1100, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 743-44.
122. The court considered whether the Program was unconstitutionally vague; whether it
violated the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment; whether it denied plaintiffs equal protec-
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Program 1was
entirely constitutional and reversed the superior court
23

judgment.

Although plaintiffs petitioned the California Supreme Court for a
hearing, the court denied the petition on May 2, 1985.124 The State Bar
of California distributed $7.2 million of the $12.2 million it had collected
since the Program's implementation in March 1983,125 on March 4,
1985. 126
II.
A.

The Taking Clause Issue

Introduction

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 127 These familiar and yet imponderable words apply to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 128 and pose a formidable
threat to California's Legal Services Trust Account Program.12 9 In published opinions, the highest courts of five states,13 0 and an appellate court
tion of the laws; and whether it violated plaintiffs' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at
1104-09, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 746-49.
123. Id. at 1109, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
124. See 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Spring 1983, at 1;see also supra note 12.
125. Trust Account Funds Released, supra note 107, at 65.
126. Interview, supra note 107.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the philosophical source of the Taking
Clause, see Comment, Property Versus Civil Rights." An Alternative to the Double Standard, 11
N. KY. L. REv. 51 (1984). The author traces the clause to John Locke's theories on government. Id. at 100.
Every state constitution has a comparable provision. 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1(2) (rev. 3d ed. 1981). California's taking provision states: "Private
property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation,. . . has first
been paid to, or into court for, the owner .... " CAL. CONST. art I, § 19. The scope of
compensable injury to property is more expansive under the California Constitution due to the
additional "damage" language. 5 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 3448-49 (8th
ed. 1974). Under the independent state grounds doctrine, California may provide more, but
not less, protection for property owners than that provided by the federal Constitution. See
generally, Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfallsand a Better Way, 25 WASH. J. URB.&
CONTEMp. L. 3, 4 (1983).
128. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 0980); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); see Chicago, Burlington and Quincy RR
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
129. See Rivlin, supra note 8.
130. In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 975-76, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1982); In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981). Cf.In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
283 Ark. 252, 254, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357 (1984) (approving program by modifying prior decision that questioned program's feasibility on "taking" and due process grounds), modifying
279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W.2d 480, 480-81 (1983); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672
P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (citing reasoning of Florida, New Hampshire and Minnesota, that
there is "no federal or state constitutional impediment" to the program).
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in California,1 3 ' have concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to interest on lawyers' trust account programs. Yet, "[lt is generally
agreed among proponents and opponents [of the programs] that the issue
of taking will most
likely be resolved ultimately by the United States
132
Supreme Court.

Proponents of California's Program have asserted constitutionality
based upon three major concepts. The first is that clients have no recognizable property interest in the earnings generated through the Program. 133 If clients have no property, they have no procedural due
process rights to notice and no interest that can be taken in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The second concept is that the recent United
States Supreme Court decision of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc v.
Beckwith 134 is inapposite. 135 Finally, proponents assert that even if clients have some cognizable property right in the interest income, the Program is a constitutional exercise of California's inherent police powers. 136
The following discussion will demonstrate the tenuous nature of these

propositions.
Takings law generally conjures up images of land use zoning and
eminent domain proceedings. The classic takings case occurs when the
government formally condemns a landowner's fee simple title.'
It is
important to note that the same constitutional standards apply to personal property interests. 13 Because there are so few cases on point, 139 it
131. Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
132. Rivlin, supra note 8, at 1040.
133. See Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48.
134. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
135. Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 748 ("Webb's does not address
issues pertinent to this case.").
136. See id. at 1107, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 748 (describing program as a regulation that promotes the common good).
137. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 0980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See I J. SACKMAN, NICHoLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.1[2] (rev. 3d. ed.
1981).
Recent Supreme Court cases applying the Fifth Amendment to deprivations of personal
property include Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984) (forced disclosure of
trade secrets under federal statute held to constitute taking when confidentiality previously
assured); Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Ina v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (interest income earned
on interpleader fund taken by Florida county held to constitute taking); and Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979) (right to sell Indian artifacts composed of protected bird parts barred by
Eagle Protection Act held not to constitute taking). All apply standards developed in Fifth
Amendment cases involving real property.
139. See supra note 130. Until Carroll, no published opinion addressed the constitutional
issues raised by trust account programs in an adversarial proceeding. See, e.g., In re Minnesota, 332 N.W.2d at 151 (opinion in response to Minnesota State Bar Ass'n petition seeking
amendments to state's Code of Professional Responsibility); In re New Hampshire, 122 N.H.
at 975, 453 A.2d at 1259 (opinion in response to New Hampshire Bar Ass'n petition seeking
amendment to supreme court rules); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 799
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is necessary to examine the California Legal Services Trust Account Program and the recent Carrolldecision through criteria developed largely
in the area of real property law.
B. The Property Issue
L What is property?
In an early description of property, Blackstone listed the "free use,
enjoyment and disposal" of physical acquisitions as three rights that cannot be controlled or diminished in the absence of lawful authority."4
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has declared that "property"
includes the rights to "acquire, use and dispose of" things in addition to
the physical objects themselves.1 4 1 The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
this "group" or "bundle" of rights approach to property in the context of
Taking Clause challenges. 4 2
During the 1970's, the Court devised a parallel and considerably
more expansive concept of property in procedural due process cases.143
In the 1972 decision of Board of Regents v. Roth,'" the Court declared
that "[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.
(Fla. 1978) (opinion in response to petition of Board of Governors of the Florida Bar requesting amendments to rules governing the practice of law). The only other adversarial proceeding
in the United States was fied in the federal district court in Tampa, Florida on October 11,
1984. Glaeser v. State Bar of Florida, No. 84-1345 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 1984). See generally
supra note 9. Other than Carroll,the published opinions have not analyzed the Fifth Amendment issue in detail. See Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1105-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48.
140. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-35, quoted in BOSSELMAN, CALLIES &
BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 51, 56 (1973).
141. The Court often cites its description of Fifth Amendment. property as set forth in
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (emphasis added):
It is conceivable that [the term "property" in the Taking Clause] was used in its
vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen
exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in
a more accurate sense to denote the group of rightsinhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the
construction given the phrase has been the latter.
See, eg., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2873-74 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n.6 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.dissenting). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273,
598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375-76 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See generally
Michelman, Property, Utility, And Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1185 n.41 (discussing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch.I, Introductory Note (1936)); Oakes, "PropertyRights" in ConstitutionalAnalysisToday, 56 WASH. L. REv. 583, 584-90 (1981).
142. See, e.g., Monsanto, 104 S.Ct. at 2878; United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459
U.S. 70, 75-76 (1982) (dicta); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 82; Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-80 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979).
143. See generally Oakes, supra note 141, at 596-98; Comment, supra note 127, at 74-85.
144. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 12:463

Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law. .. ,,45 The Court demanded that persons claiming procedural due process protection have more "than an abstract need or desire"
or "unilateral expectation of property."1'46 They must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement to it." 47 The Court devised a two-tier test which
requires identification of a substantive interest on the first tier, 148 and
determination of whether that interest constitutes a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" under the federal constitution on the second tier.49 Under
this standard, entirely incorporeal interests have been recognized as
"property" subject to procedural due process protection. 50 However,
these Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections are only available
to safeguard interests a "person has already acquired."'
Commentators have criticized this distinction between the constitutional definition of property in taking cases and procedural due process
cases.152 For example, Professor Tribe found that there was "no good
due process concept of property was
reason" that the broader procedural
1 53

not used in the takings context.

Recently, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Roth
145. Id. at 577. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974).
146. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
147. Id.
148. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 0976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02
(1972); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
149. E.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,9 (1978). For general
discussions of the two-tiered procedural due process test of property interests, see generally
Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 457-70 (1977) and Monaghan, Of "'Liberty"and "Property,"
62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 434-39 (1977). Monaghan stresses this second tier stating that no
"principled analysis" could depend entirely on reference to state law. Id. at 440-41, 442.
150. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten-day suspension from school deprived students of property interest in education); see Oakes, supra note 141, at 597; Baker &
Wood, supra note 1, at 359-60.
151. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Oakes, supra note 141, at 598.
152. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-3 at 459 n.ll (1977) discussed in
Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 355-56. See also Oakes, supra note 141, at 598.
153. L. TRIBE, supra note 152. But cf Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 355-56.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has refused to
apply the procedural due process property definition in Taking Clause challenges. E.g., Kizas
v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (presupposition that a legitimate claim of
entitlement rises to the level of "property" protected by the Taking Clause lacks foundation).
Cf Security, 459 U.S. at 75 (rejecting contention that because broad definition of property
under Due Process Clause encompasses both contractual and traditional rights, Taking Clause
should give no greater protection to traditional rights than contractual rights) (dicta); Geneva
Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 494 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Hufstedler, J. dissenting) (if procedural due process entitlements were absolute, government
could not take them without paying just compensation despite procedural due process
protections).
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procedural due process definition of property in Taking Clause cases.154
In these decisions, the Court has identified a state or federal law source
for the property interest but has not analyzed whether the interest is a
legitimate claim of entitlement under the federal Constitution.'55
Although it appears that the Court is moving towards a "unified theory
property,"' 5 6 it has not yet fully embraced the
of constitutional
157
concept.
2. Do clients have a property interest in the earningsgenerated through
the Program?
Property is one of the "three key words" in the Taking Clause.' 58
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'59 the Court acknowledged that taking challenges are dismissed when the claimant's interest is not "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 6° Proponents
that clients
of trust account programs across the country have claimed
161
have no cognizable property interest in the earnings.
a. The Florida Formulation
In its final implementing decision of 1981,162 the Florida Supreme
Court formulated the concept that clients have no property interest in
the earnings. It stated two reasons. First, "no client is compelled to part
with 'property' by reason of a state directive, since the program creates
");
154. See Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2872 ("We are mindful of [this] basic axiom ....
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) ("We, of course, also accept [this] proposition, pressed upon us
by appellees ....
"); cf Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 84; KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 166, 179. Justice
Blackmun questioned the KaiserAetna Court's use of state property definitions in a dissent.
KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 191-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2872-74; Texaco, 454 U.S. at 525-30; Webbs, 449
U.S. at 161-62; Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 84.
156. Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 356.
157. Compare Security, 459 U.S. at 75 (various interests can be "property" under broad
Due Process Clause definition and yet receive differing protection under Taking Clause) with
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161-64 (interests can be rejected as "property" under state law and broad
Due Process Clause definition and yet receive protection under Taking Clause).
158. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
159. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
160. Id. at 124-25. The Court stated: "[W]hile the challenged government action caused
economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes." It cites several cases and a 1964 law review article for this proposition. Id. at 125.
The article states in part: "Since the question being asked is what sort of protection is to be
given to property the initial task must be to develop a workable concept of what we mean
when we talk about property." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964).
161. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
162. In re Interest On Trust Accounts, 402 So.-2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
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income where there had been none before."' 163 The court cited the property definition passage" 6 from Board of Regents v. Roth. 16 5 The unmistakable import of this passage is that since clients had no prior right to
interest under state law,166 they could have no constitutional "property"
conception of property was first
once any interest was generated. 167 This
168
used in procedural due process cases.
Second, clients have no property interest in income that "would
never benefit [them] under any set of circumstances."' 169 The Florida
court offered no legal support for this proposition. It postulated that client concerns would not hinder the program "since only clients with nominal funds or those to be held for short durations-that is, clients who
cannot themselves benefit from investing-are in effect providing the
pooled income source."' 170 This second argument hinges on the impracticability of investing nominal or short-term client trust funds: clients
have no "property" until the interest earned on their principal exceeds
administrative costs and thus can benefit them.
The Florida court's formulation was quickly adopted by other states
as they began implementing trust account programs.' 7 ' Indeed, the
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility also accepted the Florida Court's conclusion that interest
nominal or short-term deposits does not constitute cliearned on clients'
72
ents' property.'
163. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
164. "[P]roperty interests . . . are not created by the constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law. . . ." Id. at 395 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
Although the original source of this quoted passage is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972), the Florida court cited its repetition in the Webb's case, attempting to harmonize its holding with Webb's. Cf infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
165. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
167. But see infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
169. In re Interest, 402 So. 2d at 395 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 396.
171. See In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 283 Ark. 252, 254, 675 S.W.2d 355,
357 (1984) ("The funds in question are not now available to individual clients, and for practical reasons cannot be made available to them."), modifying 279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W.2d 480
(1983); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982) ("There simply is
no 'property' now in existence that would be taken."); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122
N.H. 971, 976, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1982) ("[A]s a practical matter, [the income] would not
have been available for return to clients nor would otherwise exist[.]. .. [Tihe income generated [can]not fairly be classified as client 'property.' ").
172. Citing the Florida court, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility states, "[T]he rationale for the ethical acceptability of these programs is the same as the
premise for acceptability in constitutional law and tax law. . . . [Tlhe interest earned is not
the clients' property ...." ABA Op. 348, supra, note 19, at 1506.
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7
b. Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith1

3

In Webbs, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed
the constitutionality of a statute that took interest earned on a privately
owned principal fund. The amount of interest involved was approximately $100,000.174 Therefore, for obvious reasons, the court did not
address the issue raised by Florida's second argument: whether interest
must exceed expenses before it constitutes "property" for purposes of the
Taking Clause. It did, however, address the Florida court's first point:
that a state may create new
property interests and take them without
1 75
offending the Constitution.
Webb's involved a Florida statute which provided that "[a]ll interest
accruing from moneys deposited [in Florida court registries] shall be
deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court .
,176 In
1976, Eckerd's of College Park, Inc., a Florida corporation, agreed to
purchase the assets of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., another Florida corporation. When it appeared that Webb's debts exceeded its
purchase price, Eckerd's filed a complaint of interpleader. Webb's and
approximately two hundred of Webb's creditors were named as defendants. 177 Pursuant to the interpleader statute, 178 Eckerd's paid the entire
$1,812,145.77 purchase price to the court registry.1 79 The only Florida
statute that permitted the fund to earn interest was the same statute that
vested ownership of that interest in the court clerk. 8 Thus the defendants had no pre-existing, state created right to interest, apart from the
very statute that vested ownership of the earnings in the government.
When a receiver was finally appointed, he requested the accumulated interest as well as the principal; but the court clerk refused to re173. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
174. Id. at 158.
175. Id. at 163.
176. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.33 (West 1974). The pertinent part of the statute provided:
Moneys deposited in the registry of the court shall be deposited in interest-bearing
certificates at the discretion of the clerk, subject to ... guidelines .... All interest

accruing from moneys deposited shall be deemed income of the office of the clerk of
the circuit court investing such moneys and shall be deposited in the same accounts
as are other fees and commissions of the clerk's office.
177. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 156-57.
178. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.106(4) (West 1966). The statute derives from the Uniform
Commercial Code; it provided in part:
A transferee may within ten days after taking possession of the goods, discharge his
obligations under this section by an action in the circuit court for the county where
the transferor had his principal place of business in this state interpleading all creditors in the list of creditors required by § 676.6-104. In such event the court shall
require the consideration to be deposited into the registry of the court and thereupon
shall decree the goods to be free and clear of the claims of such creditors and that
such creditors should file their claims with the court. (Emphasis added).
179. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 157.
180. Brief For The Appellees at 5, 13-14, Webb's, 449 U.S. 155.
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lease the interest. 8 1 Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
the Florida county could keep the earnings. 18 2 One of the court's reasons
was that the statute only took the interest that the statute itself

created.183
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Florida violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by exacting the interest earned on the privately owned fund.' 8 4 The Supreme
Court held that it did.
The Court addressed the argument that Florida's statute created the
right to interest and thereby could vest ownership of the interest in the
county.1 85 The Court acknowledged that apart from the Florida statute
involved, Florida law did not require that any interest be earned.1 86 The
Court also acknowledged that " '[p]roperty interests. . . are not created
by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by . . .state law . . . ,"87 However, the Court rejected the
notion that Webb's creditors had a mere "unilateral expectation" of
property on this basis.' 8 8 Since the principal was held solely for Webb's
creditors' benefit, the creditors had a state-created property right to their
portions of the piincipal. 89 Additionally, the Court stated
unequivocally:
[A] claimant ultimately determined to be entitled to all or a share
of the [principal] fund [may claim] a proper share of the interest,
the fruit of the fund's use, that is realized in the interim ...
[T]he State's having mandated the accrualof interest does not mean
the State or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of the
181. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158.
182. Id. (Justice Arthur J. England, Jr. participated in Florida's per curiam decision in
Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979). England authored
the two Florida trust account decisions.) See supra note 69.
183. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158 (quoting Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374
So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1979)).
Proponents of the California Program have distinguished Webb's by emphasizing its rejection of Florida's public money rationale. State Bar of California's Notice of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, at 43,
Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984) [hereinafter cited as State Bar Summary Judgment]. This view ignores the Florida court's further reasoning--equally applicable to the California program-which was rejected.by the Supreme
Court. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
184. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160.
185. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
186. "Appellees submit. . . and we accept the proposition-that, apart from statute, Florida law does not require that interest be earned ....
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (citations
omitted).
187. Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). The Court described this further proposition as one "pressed upon us by the appellees." Webb's, 449 U.S. at
161.
188. Webbs, 449 U.S. at 161.
189. Id.
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interest.1 90
In another part of its opinion, the Court stated definitively, "The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and areproperty just as the fund itself is property."1 91 It stressed that the practical
effect of the statute was to appropriate the value of "the use of the fund
for the period in which it is held . .
," 12 In these passages the
Supreme Court clearly
rejected
Florida's
rationale
that the statute takes
1 93
only what it creates.
How did the Supreme Court of Florida base its trust account decision on a procedural due process argument rejected in Webb's? Clearly,
the value of the earnings appropriated by the state in Webb's played a
large part in distinguishing the cases.1 94 But the critical difference is not
that the state created a new property right through its powers to create
and define property interests, but that as a practical matter this particular property could not exist but for the statute.1 95
In Webb's, the $1,812,145.77 principal fund was capable of generating interest in excess of expenses without regard to any statute at issue in
the case. But, by definition, the trust account programs apply only to
190. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text; cf. Minnesota Developments, supra
note 2, at 1298 n.68 ("Webb's thus established that the Supreme Court may recognize a constitutionally protected property interest even when a state's highest court, interpreting its own
statutes, does not recognize a property right.").
194. Proponents of California's Program and of other trust account plans nationwide have
devoted substantial attention to distinguishing Webb's. In fact, the Taking Clause arguments
in the Florida case address the taking issue solely in this context. In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981). The court described two "distinguishing features." Id. at 395. The first is that no client is compelled to part with "property." Id. The
second is that the program is voluntary "not only from the perspective of attorneys but, in the
most practical sense, from the will of clients, for no attorney or firm will participate in the
program in the face of a strenuous objection from its clients." Id. at 396. As to this second
feature, it is difficult to understand the court's reasoning since the Florida plan does not require that clients be notified of the plan in the first place. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
In the California litigation, Webb's was distinguished in three significant respects. First,
the Webb's Court specifically restricted its holding to the facts of the underlying controversy.
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164-65. Second, the principal sum was deposited in Webb's as a prerequisite to use of the court in accordance with a state statute. Id. Third, $100,000 in interest is a
significant sum, while the unknown amounts of interest generated on nominal or short-term
deposits are not. See State Bar Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 44.
Although these factual differences may appear decisive, the Court's reasoning in Webb's is
indistinguishable on the significant legal issues that arose in the litigation over California's
Program. See supra notes 185-93; see also infra 251, 255-57, 304-18, 400 and accompanying
text.
195. State Bar Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 46-47. The State Bar of California
described this difference as one between funds "inherently" able to earn "significant interest"
and those "intrinsic[ally]" without "interest-bearing potential."
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principal amounts incapable of generating interest in excess of expenses. 196 As a practical matter, the only way for nominal or short-term
funds to generate enough interest to offset costs is if the costs are lowered
by the programs.
In essence, Florida's second reason that clients have no propertyimpracticability-subsumes its procedural due process argument. The
state is not merely redefining property interests and vesting ownership.
It is actually creating property that could not practicably exist before.
This impracticability argument was offered by Florida and subsequently
cited without legal support,' 97 until Carrollv. State Bar of California.9 '
c. The California Court of Appeal Formulation
In Carroll,the California Court of Appeal did not reason that California can create new property interests and vest ownership in the
state.1 99 Instead, it stressed Florida's second point: that it is impossible
for clients to benefit from investment. 2" Additionally, the court addressed an important property issue overlooked by the Florida court:
whether the Program takes clients' property right to use and control the
uses of their principal.2 0 ' This final issue arises from the traditional Taking Clause formulation of constitutional property: the rights to acquire,
use, and dispose of physical things in addition to the rights to the things
themselves.2 °2
The court bolstered the impracticability theory with legal support.
"Economics" not only prevents investment to benefit clients, but banking
law creates an additional "barrier."20 3 The Program requires attorneys
to invest their clients' funds in negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW")
accounts. 2° NOW account regulations bar deposits "which consist
solely of funds in which the entire beneficial interest is held by" profitearning organizations. 20 5 Absent the Program, profit-earning corporations or partnerships cannot utilize NOW accounts.
The Program "overcomes" this banking law barrier by designating a
public entity, the State Bar of California, as the beneficiary of the inter196. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Id.
197. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
198. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
199. This argument surfaced earlier in the Carrolllitigation. See State Bar Petition, supra
note 7, at 57 (California has "Broad Power To Define New Forms Of Property"); id. at 61-62
(California is "bound solely by the limits of its ingenuity" in defining and vesting new property
interests.).
200. Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1100, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740,
743-44 (1984).
201. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
203. Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1100, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
204. See supra notes 63, 83 and accompanying text.
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (Supp. IV. 1980); 12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1983).
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The Carrollcourt reasoned that "the affected class of legal clients
is by definition limited to those persons whose deposited funds cannot,
underpresent banking regulationsbe deposited in an interest-bearing account so as to earn net income for the client's individual profit ... "I'
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, current banking regulations do not prevent the entire affected class of legal clients from investing since profit-earning individual clients, public entity clients, and nonprofit organizational clients are free to invest in NOW accounts.2 °8
Second, NOW regulations prohibit deposits in which any part of the
"beneficial interest" in the account is owned by profit-earning organizations. 20 9 Clearly, even a profit-earning corporation that places funds in
trust with its attorney has a beneficial interest in its attorney's trust fund
account. California's Program, like all IOLTA plans, depends upon Federal Reserve Board rulings that construe the banking statutes so that clients have no beneficial interest.2 10 Commentators have compared this
result 211 to the same "ipse dixit" technique rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith.2' The
Carroll court's reliance on banking regulations is unsatisfactory 21 3 because its reasoning is inaccurate, and the regulations themselves have
been construed to benefit the Program.
The Carrollcourt also analyzed whether clients have a property interest in controlling the use of their principal funds. It reasoned that clients relinquish control of their principal property when they place it in
trust with their attorneys. 2 4 The only "meaningful" right of control clients retain is to recover their prinicipal because the principal property "is
not economically capable of generating net income . . ,215
The court also noted that once clients' funds generate interest, clients have no compensable right to control who benefits from the earnings: "The abstract right to control where interest earned on a person's
money may be funneled is not an economic loss subject to monetary
est.

206. See Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1100, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
207. Id. at 1105, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 747 (emphasis added).
208.

12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 217.157.
209. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2).
210. Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 334-35, 335 n.39.
211. Id. at 335 n.39.
212. 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield
against the arbitrary use of governmental power.").
213. Indeed, banking regulations did not bar one of the plaintiffs, Elizabeth Carroll, from
investing in NOW accounts since she is an individual. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2).
214. Carroll, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1107, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
215. Id.
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2 16

The practical effect of Carrollis that client property will not be accorded constitutional protection until its value rises to a certain economic level. This result contradicts basic trust principles under
California law and does not comport with some recent United States
Supreme Court precedent.
Under California law, interest is defined as "the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money." 2' 17 When California attorneys hold their clients' funds,
the law of trusts and provisions of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct govern the attorney-client relationship.21 8 In the past, these
standards imposed no duty upon attorneys to invest client trust funds to
benefit clients. For example, Rule 8-101 requires safekeeping, accounting
21 9
and prompt delivery of client funds, but does not require investment.
Basic trust law principles generally impose a duty to invest,220 but not
when the primary purpose of the trust is safeguarding rather than productivity. 221 As in Florida, California attorneys have deposited their clibearing trust accounts and
ents' funds in commingled, non-interest
'222
"clients have accepted this practice.

California law may not have required attorneys to invest client trust
funds as trustees, but if they did, any interest generated belonged to the
clients. 223 For example, in a 1970 ethics opinion,22 4 the San Francisco
22 5
Bar Association ruled that attorneys could properly open trust savings
216. Id. at 1106, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 747. The court's reasoning is difficult to understand
since invalidation of the Program rather than compensation is the proper remedy under California law. See infra notes 444-47 and accompanying text.
217. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1915 (West 1985).
218. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1-100, 8-101 (1984); G.
WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS § 288 (2d ed. 1920).
219. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8-101 (1984).
220. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2261-2262 (West 1985); 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 181 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 611 (rev. 2d ed.
1980).
221. ScoTr, supra note 220; BOGERT, supra note 220. See Allin v. Williams, 97 Cal. 403,
409, 32 P. 441, 443 (1893); Higgins v. City of Santa Monica, 62 Cal. 2d 24, 29-30, 396 P.2d 41,
44, 41 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1964).
222. ABA Op. 348, supra, note 19, at 1502.
223. See Board of Law Library Trustees v. Lowery, 67 Cal. App. 2d 480, 154 P.2d 719
(1945) cited with approvalin Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 16263 (1980); Pomona City School Dist. v. Payne, 9 Cal. App. 2d 510, 516, 50 P.2d 822, 825
(1935). See also ScoTr, supra note 220, at 1464 (Trustee who has no duty to invest trust
property is accountable for any income actually earned.); cf. Greenbaum v. State Bar of California, 15 Cal. 3d 893, 903, 544 P.2d 921, 927, 126 Cal. Rptr. 785, 791 (1976).
224. Bar Ass'n of San Francisco Legal Ethics Comm., Op. No. 1970-3 (1970). Cf. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 545 (1962); R. WISE, LEGAL
ETHICS 239 (1966).
225. See supra note 63. In 1970, interest bearing demand checking accounts were not generally available.
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accounts, but only if any interest generated went to the clients and not to
the attorneys. In Greenbaum v. State Bar of California,zz6 the California
Supreme Court imposed sanctions on an attorney who deprived his client
of interest by misappropriating his client's principal.2 27 This result comports with American Bar Association rulings that attorneys cannot
charge their clients for the costs of administering trust funds. 2 ' It follows that although clients may have had no state-created right to earn
interest in the first place, they did have existing rules and understandings2 29 which entitled them to interest if any was in fact earned. The
Carrollcourt's conclusion that clients relinquish control of their principal to their attorneys does not comport with this precedent.
In recent Taking Clause challenges, the United States Supreme
Court has analyzed the nature of the property interest taken rather than
its economic value. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corporation,2 30 defendants argued that cable television equipment installed on
plaintiff's building was so small that it impaired no constitutional interest. 23' The Court determined that the size of the interest invaded was a
matter of degree rather than of principle,2 32 and accorded Taking Clause
protection.233 Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
resale value of household goods was too "low" to merit protection under
the Taking Clause.23 4 While the Court could not reject the contention
"out of hand," it indicated that this analysis contradicted state law property characterizations. 3 5
It therefore appears that clients' traditional property right in using
and controlling the uses of their principal cannot be denied because of its
small economic value.23 6 It becomes necessary for the "property" issue
to rest largely on the unique nature of trust account programs and the
novel assertion that interest only constitutes "property" when it exceeds
its owner's expenses.
226. 15 Cal. 3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1976).

227. Id. at 903, 544 P.2d at 927, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
228. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 545 (1962);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 991 (1967).
229. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
230. 258 U.S. 419 (1982).
231. Id. at 438 n.16. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the economic impact
on the plaintiff was de minimus. Id. at 445 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It also determined that
plaintiff could have no reasonable investment-backed expectation in the space since she was
unaware of the cable equipment when she purchased the property. Id.
232. See id. at 436-37 & n.13, 438 n.16 ("[Whether the installation is a taking does not
depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread box.").
233. Id. at 441.
234. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76, 78 (1982) (dicta).
235. Id.
236. One recent commentator surveys procedural due process deprivations and determines
that "the property right itself must be significant; the loss in dollars and cents to an individual
should not be dispositive." Comment, supra note 70, at 1025.
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d. Impracticability: The Trust Account Theory of Property
(i) Plan details
In the California litigation, as in the original Florida decision that
formulated the concept,23 7 the impracticability argument rests on practi-

cal rather than legal support.2 3 8 Justice Frankfurter once embraced similar common sense reasoning when he said: "[T]here comes a point where
' 2 39
this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.
Impracticability is the import of proponents' statements such as "Existing Case Law Recognizes. . . Economic Realities. ' , 2 1 In Carroll,the
California Court of Appeal described "economics" as a barrier to client
investment.241 Proponents' "property" arguments, therefore, depend in
large part on impracticability as it is demonstrated in the details of the
plan.
Prior to the Program, attorneys or law firms maintained single, noninterest-bearing commercial checking accounts in which they commingled all their clients' nominal or short-term funds.24 2 Financial institutions used this money without paying interest and gained a substantial
benefit. By requiring the institutions to pay interest on these accounts,
the Program ends this practice. The financial institutions forward the
net balance to the State Bar of California at least quarterly, 24 3 with detailed statements for each account. 2' In theory, the administrative costs
and fees at this point are small enough that even nominal or short-term
principal amounts are capable of generating interest in excess of these
charges.2 45

If the interest were made available to the clients rather than the
State Bar of California, then attorneys and law firms would incur additional fees and expenses. Attorneys receive statements from their financial institutions showing the net interest earned after subtracting the
service fees. They would have to determine which clients' funds were
deposited in the account during the period of the statement, the amounts
237. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
238. See id.
239. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
240. State Bar Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 41.
241. Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1100, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740,
744 (1984).
242. See generally supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
243. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6212(c) (West Supp. 1982).
244. Id.
245. This theory has not always proved to be true in the actual operation of the Program.
In the period between May 1983 and early January 1984, approximately one-third of the trust
fund accounts had not generated enough interest to offset bank service charges. Interview with
Bruce Hamilton, Director, California Legal Services Trust Fund Program (Jan. 9, 1984). The
Bar paid these charges with funds generated on other accounts. Id.
The negative balances may result from high service charges set by some banks. Id. See
supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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deposited, and the portion of the net interest earned on the account attributable to each client. Computer sub-account techniques could be
used for this purpose.2 46 Attorneys would have to credit each client's
account.24 7 Perhaps checks would be written to each client for his or her
portion of the interest; mailing the checks would require postage. Telephone charges might be incurred to contact the client. The entire process would necessarily require attorney, accountant or secretarial time, as
well as expenses for the paper, computer and other administrative costs.
In the theory of the Program, these additional costs of sub-accounting each client's pro rata share "dissipate the benefit." 24 The basis of the
Program is that nominal or short-term funds are capable of generating
enough interest to offset expenses when the interest is remitted to a single source' (the State Bar of California), but not when it is remitted to
multiple individual clients. Thus, if a client's principal will not generate
enough earnings to offset all of these various expenses, the client has no
property interest. According to the Program's proponents, this situation
justifies transfering the earnings to legal aid programs-at least as long as
the expenses are low enough to ensure a positive balance.
(ii) The theory applied
There are serious problems with this impracticability theory. It assumes that clients will receive no benefit from investing their nominal or
short-term trust funds because it will cost them more in expenses than
they will gain in interest. For example, if a client's net portion of the
interest were $50.00, but the administrative fees and costs were $55.00,
then that client would have lost $5.00. But this argument assumes that
all of the costs will be charged to the client in a pro rata share. American
246. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also 2 IOLTA UPDATE, Spring 1985, at
5.
247. Professor Orlando Delogu of the University of Maine School of Law testified before
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine that program expenses would be reduced if attorneys
adopted this method of allocating interest to individual clients. See Points and Authorities Re:
Summary Judgment at 7-8, Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Carroll Summary Judgment]. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine rejected the proposed trust account program in early 1983. 1 IOLTA UPDATE,
Summer 1983, at 2.
248. State Bar Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 39.
249. The State Bar of California advised attorneys that $50.00 was a reasonable estimate of
the amount of interest a given principal fund would have to generate before its earnings would
offset expenses. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 82, at 3. The Bar
conducted no independent study to determine the accuracy of this figure; it borrowed the
$50.00 benchmark from the Maryland program, which designates $50.00 as a recommended
investment standard. Interview, supra note 245. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2)
(Supp. 1983). See Minnesota Developments, supra note 2, at 1291-93, 1309-10 (recommending
specific guidelines for attorney investment to avert "taking" challenges).
In order to earn $50.00 in interest at the current 5 1/4% rate, a $500.00 principal sum
would have to be held in an account for 654 days. Id. at 1292 n.36.
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Bar Association Ethics Committee rulings prohibit attorneys from charging their clients for these costs. 250 If either the bank or the law firm
absorbs the costs, or distributes the costs among all its clients, then the
individual client will experience a benefit despite the loss to the system as
a whole. For example, if a client's funds earn $50.00 in interest, but the
law firm does not charge that client for its extra expenses in computing
and forwarding the interest, then the client will gain. This would result
even if the administrative expenses totaled $100.00. However unwise this
system would be from the standpoint of efficiency, it cannot be said that
clients cannot benefit from the investment of their nominal or short-term
funds.
In fact, under current American Bar Association rulings, the likely
result of this system would be that law firms would raise all of their clients' bills by some set amount rather than attempt to distribute the expenses pro rata per client. This result is also likely because the process of
apportioning the expenses would be cumbersome and costly. In this instance the expenses have not been decreased, but have been diluted in the
pool of all of the firm's clients.
In short, even within the confines of this impracticability argument,
the notion that clients could never benefit by investing their nominal or
short-term funds is highly debatable. While it may be senseless to impose
a system on attorneys that would cost them more than it would benefit
their clients, this does not mean that clients have no "property" for purposes of the Taking Clause.
The effect of this impracticability argument denies property status to
any interest that only potentially benefits its owner. In other words,
"property" is redefined as an interest that must necessarily benefit its
owner. This notion is without legal support and contrary to Webb's. In
Webb's, the Supreme Court warned that states may not redefine property
in order to appropriate it without paying compensation. 251 As a factual
matter, the interest generated for each client may be minimal.25 2 But this
250. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
251. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). Accord
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) ("[The government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights").
252. See supra note 249. Commentators have described "the best argument" available to
proponents of trust account programs as the common law doctrine of de minimis non curat

lex. Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 358, 360-61. The thrust of the argument is that the
interest sums involved are too small to deserve constitutional protection. Id.
This notion is contrary to cases that have held the doctine inapplicable to positive and
wrongful property invasions. See Allen v. Stowell, 145 Cal. 666, 668-69, 79 P. 371, 372 (1905);
see also Ives v. Edison, 124 Mich. 402, 409-410, 83 N.W. 120, 122-23 (1900) (Courts have a
duty to protect persons in their property rights even though the actual property holding may
be small.). The doctrine also has been excluded from use in cases of statutory interpretation.

See Montgomery Light & Traction Co. v. Avant, 202 Ala. 404, 405, 80 So. 497, 498 (1918);
Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair, 43 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 884, 887, 111 P.2d 753, 755 (1941)
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fact does not justify denying clients' ownership interest and taking the
sums to benefit others without clients' consent.2 53
(iii) Traditionaltheory conflicts
The traditional definition of property as the right to possess, use and
dispose of 25 4 physical things highlights another problem with proponents' argument. The principal sums held by attorneys are clients' property. In Webb's, the Court described the statute that took the interest as
"appropriating for the [state] the value of the use of the [principal] fund
for the period in which it is held."' 25 5 The right to use property and
control its uses is itself a property right which is recognized as one of the
sticks in the bundle of rights. 25 6 Thus, the State of California has affected a property interest through the Program without regard to complicated notions of economic benefit to the owner. The fact that clients may
not necessarily benefit from the use of investment does not justify investing the funds to benefit others without clients' consent.
e. Conclusion: Clients Have Property
It follows that clients have a property interest in the earnings generated through the Program. Webb's instructs that an owner of a principal
sum is entitled to its earnings as the "fruit of the fund's use."2'57 The
state may not appropriate the interest--either by mandating its accrual, 25 8 or by redefining it as non-property until it exceeds a certain
value.25 9 Practical problems in crediting individual clients with their
portions of the interest or with assessing them for their share of the expenses do not eliminate clients' property rights in controlling the use of
their principal sums.
(quoting Feeney v. Eastern Racing Ass'n, 303 Mass. 602, 603, 22 N.E.2d 259, 259-260 (1939)).
It also has been excluded when the underlying issue involves a private individual against the
sovereign. United States v. Lamb, 294 F. Supp. 419, 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
Under California law, the doctrine has no application when a permanent right is being
adjudicated and when the judgment will carry costs. Southern Cal. Collection Co. v. Napkie,
106 Cal. App. 2d 565, 572, 235 P.2d 434, 438 (1951); Ballin, 43 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 887, 222

P.2d at 755. See Kenyon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Cal. 454,458-59, 35 P. 75, 76 (1893).
Cf. Tucker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 44 Cal. App. 3d 330, 332, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 567, 568 (1975).
253. See In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 279 Ark. 84, 87, 648 S.W.2d 480, 481
(1983), modified, 283 Ark. 252, 254, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357 (1984).
254. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
255. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (emphasis
added).
256. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.

257. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162. See also Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809)
(Johnson, J.) ("In equity, interest goes with the principal, as the fruit with the tree.").
258. See supra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 237-51 and accompanying text.
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The Taking Issue

1. Can a police power regulation effect a taking?
Program proponents describe the statute as a valid police power regulation." ° The legislation appears to regulate attorney conduct, since it
prescribes how attorneys may invest their clients' funds.2 6 1 Because the
United States Supreme Court often upholds regulations such as zoning
laws despite their adverse economic impact, 62 proponents equate the
Program with this type of legislation.
States retain the police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty; 263 it is "one of the most essential. . . [and] least limitable" powers of government. z 4 The one major restriction courts impose on the
police power is that states must only exercise it to promote the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. 6 5 As long as a regulation has a permissible purpose and bears a reasonable relationship to
that purpose, then it is a valid regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 66
The police power is distinct from the governmental power of eminent domain. Through an exercise of its eminent domain powers, a state
may take private property as long as it is taken for public use and "just
compensation" is paid to the owner. 267 Despite conflicting United States
Supreme Court precedents,2 68 a state's exercise of the police power may
hamper a private property interest so that it amounts to a taking under
eminent domain.2 69 This type of regulation is invalid because it does not
260. State Bar Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 62.
261. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6211-6212 (West Supp. 1984).
262. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
263. See, e.g., Costonis, PresumptiveAnd PerSe Takings: A DecisionalModel for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 478 (1983).
264. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
265. See generally, E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONsTITUTIONAL RIGHTS §§ 4-21 (1976).
266. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ("[D]ue process ...
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 152, § 8.3 at 436-38.
267. See generally SACKMAN, supra note 138, § 1.11 at 1-9.
268. Taking Clause jurisprudence includes the notion that a police power regulation can
never constitute a taking and the idea that a regulation becomes a taking when it goes too far.
Compare Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (a regulation becomes a taking when it goes too far). Professor William B.
Stoebuck has identified these conflicting Supreme Court precedents as the possible source of
confusion in taking law generally. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, And Due Process, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059-63 (1980). Cf. Costonis, supra note 263, at 478-82.
269. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) (regulation in form of permanent physical occupation authorized by government "is a taking without
regard to the public interests it may serve"); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 649 n.14 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing cases holding that police power regu-
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pay compensation.27 0
2.

What is the applicable test?

When plaintiffs challenge a police power regulation as effecting a
taking under eminent domain, there is no clear standard for distinguishing the two powers.2 7 1 Justice Brennan acknowledged this confusion
when he described "the attempt to differentiate 'regulation' from 'taking'
as 'the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law'. . .," Commentators have identified at least nine
lations cannot constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment "as tampering with the express
language of [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon]"); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (zoning law "effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land"); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1977) ("[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose. . . or
perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property.").
For an extensive discussion of this issue by the Court, see the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 646-53. Brennan wrote for a plurality on this
issue. See infra notes 444-46 and accompanying text.
270. Aside from actual physical appropriation, "regulative" legislation also comes within
the purview of the law of eminent domain if it unreasonably or arbitrarily deprives a person of
the complete use and enjoyment of his or her property. SACKMAN, supra note 138, § 1.42 1 at
1-148 to 1-155, quoted with approvalinAgins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272, 598 P.2d
25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
The Court has not yet determined whether courts can compel local governments to compensate property owners rather than simply void the legislation when an attempted police
power regulation effects a taking. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 623. In San Diego Gas, a plurality determined that the Court had no jurisdiction over the controversy and thus refused to
discuss the underlying merits. Justice Rehnquist concurred on the jurisdiction issue but agreed
with "much" of the dissent's discussion of the merits. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
The dissent embraced the idea that regulatory takings are compensable. Id. at 653 (Brennan,
J.,dissenting).
For a discussion of the possible ramifications of Brennan's dissent, see Freilich, Solving
the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAW. 447
(1983).
271. In the past the Supreme Court has acknowledged its inability to provide clear guidelines. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984) (Court has "admitted [this inability] on numerous occasions"); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("If the Court's decisions construing the Takings Clause state anything clearly, it is
[this]"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65 (1979) ("[distinguishing the two powers] calls as much for the exercise ofjudgment as
for the application of logic"); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 ("ad hoc, factual inquiries");
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("[t]here is no set formula");
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("question [turns] upon
the particular circumstances of each case"); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156
(1952) ("[n]o rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish [the two powers]"); Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("a question of degree. . .[it] cannot be disposed of by
general propositions").
272. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 649 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting C. HARR,
LAND USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)).
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"tests" 27 3 that seek to solve the "'Taking' Equation" 274 and with each
new article a new and "better" test is proposed.2 75 By characterizing
California's Legal Services Trust Account Program as police power regulation, proponents have thrust its constitutionality into a legal quandary.
In a recent Fifth Amendment case, the United States Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the applicable standard.2 76 In Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corp.,277 the Court warned that although the
inquiry is " 'essentially ad hoc' . . . [it] is not standardless.' ' 27 s The
Court established that when governmental action permanently and physically occupies private property, a taking occurs regardless of any public
interests the regulation serves.27 9 The Court also established that absent
a permanent physical occupation, regulations "will be analyzed under the
multi-factor inquiry generally applicable to non-possessory governmental
activity. ' 2 0 The multi-factor inquiry was281first articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
a. The Penn Central Approach
Penn Central is the Court's most comprehensive discussion of takings law in recent history.2 82 It described and categorized taking jurisprudence and identified the important factors in a taking analysis.28 3
First; the economic impact on the claimant and the extent to which the
regulation interferes with investment backed expectations 284 are relevant.2 85 Although most government conduct affects economic values,
not all private losses resulting from government conduct are compensable. 2 6 The Court analyzes the facts to determine whether "justice and
273. Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 363.
274. See Freilich, supra note 270, at 447.
275. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 263, at 483-501 (recommending a four-part decisional
model); Humbach, A Unifying Theory For The Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation
and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 289-90 (1982) (suggests distinguishing between
non-compensable freedoms and compensable legally enforceable rights); Stoebuck, supra note
268, at 1091-94 (recommending that a taking only be found when private property is transferred to a government entity with the power of eminent domain).
276. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426, 440.
277. Id. at 426.
278. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 440.
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
282. See Comment, supra note 127, at 107. The author states that Penn Central "rewrote
the past century of just compensation law."
283. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 123-28.
284. See infra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
285. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
286. Id. (" 'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law' ") (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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fairness" require redistribution of the economic harm from a few persons
to the taxpayers.28 7
The Court also considers the character of the governmental action.28 8 Takings are found more readily when government physically invades property than when government adjusts economic benefits and
burdens to promote the
common good. 28 9 These basic factors are the
"multi-factor inquiry. '' 2 1 The Court has consistently used these factors
29 1
in taking analyses since Penn Central.
However, the Penn Central Court also recognized a different approach. The Court stated that "a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose ... 292 Traditionally, this language signaled a Due Process Clause analysis of the police power rather than a
Taking Clause analysis.2 93 Although commentators have severely criticized this merging of due process and takings principles,2 94 the Court
consistently blends them.2 95 This is particularly important because the
Webb's Court applied both due process principles and part of the multifactor inquiry to decide that a taking had occurred.29 6
Penn Central indicated that a taking can occur at two different
levels. First, an impermissible exercise of the police power can constitute
a taking. Second, even a statute that "substantially furthers important
public policies" ' 97 can amount to a taking if it "frustrate[s] distinct in287. Id. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
288. Id. at 124.
289. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
290. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440. These factors have also been described as constituting a
"balancing process." Id. at 435 n.12.
291. See generally infra notes 300-85 and accompanying text.
292. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 127.
293. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
294. See, ag., Stoebuck, supra note 268, at 1081. Professor Humbach reasons that the Just
Compensation Clause only addresses whether otherwise valid regulations result in takings.
Humbach, supra note 275, at 275. The Court's statements that a taking occurs when a regulation is not reasonably necessary to effect a public purpose suggest "[t]hat the government can
exceed its powers for a price .... Id. at 275 n.156.
Judge Oakes traces this confusion to the minimal protection accorded property rights
under the Due Process Clause. Oakes, supra note 141, at 591-96. He welcomes the substantive
review of legislation affecting property interests and encourages "a new recognition of substantive due process" rather than continued use of "just compensation" to fulfill this role. Id. at
625-26.
For further discussion of the interplay between substantive due process and the Taking
Clause, see Costonis, supra note 263, at 485-95. Professor Costonis recommends a separate
"Due Process-Takings Inquiry" as part of his four-part decisional model. Id. See infra notes
394-99 and accompanying text.
295. See generally infra notes 310-15, 331-34, 341, 354, 356 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
297. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (construing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922)).
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vestment-backed expectations" 298 or acquires private resources "to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions."2 99
b. Application of Penn Central
In Penn Central,and the cases that followed, the Court emphasized
one or more of the factors depending on the underlying circumstances.
In some cases, such as Penn Central, the court analyzed each factor in
3
and the
the multi-factor inquiry."c In other cases, such as Webb's"
303
3
02
recent Loretto and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co. cases, the Court
highlighted only one factor. Although it is difficult to glean broad principles from these cases, several basic ideas stand out.
First, the Court is especially wary of government conduct that physically invades or appropriates private property. In Webb's a Florida statute allowed the clerk of the circuit court to invest privately-owned
interpleader funds to benefit a Florida county. 3°4 The Court did not examine the statute's economic impact on the creditor plaintiffs nor its interference with their distinct investment-backed expectations. It chose
instead to focus on the character of the government action.30 5 Since the
statute "forced [a] contribution to general governmental revenues, ' 30 6 it
did not "merely" adjust economic benefits and burdens to promote the
common good. 30 7 The Webb's Court cited Penn Central and United
of the
States v. Causby3 °8 and described the statute as an "appropriation
30 9
beneficial use" of property rather than a mere destruction of it.
The Supreme Court also analyzed whether the statute was a permissible police power regulation.31 0 The Court acknowledged that courts
uphold government action that promotes the general welfare, even when
the action restricts a beneficial property use. 3 11 But the Court could find
no police power justification for the appropriation.31 2 Since the Florida
county had already charged a separate fee for the use of its court registry,
the Supreme Court found no nexus between the use of the principal fund
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
See id. at 128 (construing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
Id. at 128-37.
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163-64.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-27.
104 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1984).
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155-59. See supra notes 173-98.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
Id.
328 U.S. 256 (1945).
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
See id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162 ("What would justify the county's retention of that interest?").
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and the state's further taking of the interest.3" 3 Florida offered no justification,3 14 and the Court found that the statute had no "reasonable 15basis"
3
nor was it "reasonably related to the costs of using the courts.
Thus, in Webb's, the appropriative character of the governmental
action and the absence of a legitimate police power justification constituted a compensable taking. If the Court had analyzed the economic impact and reasonable investment-backed expectations factors, the result
would be unclear. Apart from the statute, Webb's creditors had no preexisting right to earn interest.31 6 Many counties retain interest earned on
interpleader funds for their services and the Court expressed "no view"
on these practices.31 7 It seems unlikely that creditors could have reasonable investment-backed expectations in an interpleader fund. Yet, the
Court did not analyze this factor and concluded that a taking had
occurred.3 18
In other cases, the Court emphasized the government conduct factor
despite legitimate police power justifications for the invasion or the appropriation. In KaiserAetna v. United States,319 petitioners leased a shallow lagoon that was segregated from navigable water by a barrier
beach.320 With the permission of the Army Corps of Engineers, they
converted the pond into a private marina accessible to the Pacific
Ocean. 32 1 The United States wished to impose a navigational servitude
32 2
on the marina and open it to the public, but Kaiser Aetna refused.
According to the Supreme Court, there was "no question" that Congress
could regulate petitioners' marina under its expansive Commerce Clause
authority.323 But this regulation caused actual physical invasion of petitioners' property.3 24 As in Penn Central and Webb's, the Court cited
Causby as an example of a compensable physical invasion by govern313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id.
Id. at 163 ("No police power justification is offered for the deprivation.").
Id.
Id. at 161.
See id. at 164-65.
Id. at 164-65 ("This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause. . .was meant

. . .to prevent.").

319. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
320. Id. at 166-67. Until 1984, large trusts owned most Hawaiian land and leased parcels
to individuals and organizations. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321
(1984). Kaiser Aetna leased its property from the Bishop Estate, one of these trusts. Kaiser
Aetna, 444 U.S. at 166-67.
321. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 167-68.
322. Id. at 168.
323. Id. at 174.
324. Id. at 180 ("This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory
power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property;
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina.").
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ment.32 5 The Court ruled that this physical invasion destroyed petitioners' "right to exclude" 3 26 others from its property. Thus, the Court
ordered the government to pay just compensation.32 7
Similarly, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.328 illustrates the Court's concern with the government action factor. In Loretto,
the plaintiff owned an apartment building in New York City.32 9 She
challenged a New York statute that required landlords to permit a cable
television company to install cable equipment on their buildings. 330 The
New York Court of Appeals determined that the statute served a legiti33
mate public purpose and thus was "within the State's police power. 1
The United States Supreme Court agreed. 3 32 But the Court stressed that
physical intrusions by government are "unusually serious" and concluded that "the character of the government action" factor is determinitive when government action permanently and physically occupies
private property.3 3 3 In these cases, public interests served by statutes are
irrelevant and a taking occurs.33 4 The Supreme Court did not consider
the other Penn Central factors. Loretto demonstrated that the Court is
especially sensitive to police power regulations outside the traditional
zoning context.33 5 It also exemplifies the Court's current emphasis on
the character of the governmental action factor.
Another basic idea emerges from reviewing the Court's recent Taking Clause decisions. In traditional regulatory cases, 336 the Court
stresses the economic impact factor and imposes a high burden on property owners. The Court requires almost "complete destruction" of the
owners' ability to profit from their property.3 3 7
Several cases illustrate this principle. In Penn Central, plaintiffs
owned one of New York City's most famous buildings, the Grand Central Terminal. 33 ' A commission designated the building as a landmark
325. Id. at 180.
326. Id. at 179.
327. Id. at 180.

328. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
329. Id. at 421.
330. Id. at 423-24. Plaintiff challenged N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney Supp.
1982).
331. Id. at 425.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 426.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 439-40 & n.17. (Logical extension of proponent's arguments "would. . . allow
the government to requisition a certain number of apartments as permanent government

offices").
336. As used in this Note, traditional regulatory cases involve laws that seek to promote
the health, safety or general welfare of the community by prohibiting or restricting property
uses. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 125. Zoning laws are the "classic example." Id.
337. Id. at 127-28.

338. Id. at 115.
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under New York's Landmarks Preservation Law.3 3 9 When plaintiffs applied to the commission for permission to build an office tower above the
terminal, they were rebuffed. "4 Plaintiffs challenged the New York statute as a taking. The Court began its analysis with police power principles; there was no dispute that the legislation was permissible.34 1
It then applied the factors from the multi-factor inquiry. It quickly
dismissed plaintiffs' argument based on the character of the government
action, since the law did not exploit the property for city purposes nor
arise from the city's entrepreneurial activities.3 42 The Court focused instead on the economic impact factor. It reasoned that existing uses of the
property were unaffected and that plaintiffs obtained a "reasonable return" from these uses. 4 3 Additionally, the law did not abrogate all use

of plaintiffs' air space. 3 " Finally, plaintiffs received some compensation
in the form of "transferable development-rights., 34 5 The Court con-

cluded that no taking had occurred because "[t]he restrictions imposed
. . .not only permit[ted a] reasonable beneficial use . . . but also afford[ed] . . .opportunities further to enhance" plaintiffs' properties.3 46
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist stressed that the law imposed a cost of several million dollars per year on Penn Central. 347 He criticized the majority's rule that a taking requires destruction of "all reasonable return" on
private property.34 8
Andrus v. Allard3 49 is another example of this principle. Appellees
traded in American Indian artifacts composed of bird feathers. 350 They
challenged the Eagle Protection Act 351 and the Migratory Bird Treaty
35 3
Act 352 which completely abolished their right to sell these products.
As in Penn Central, the Court began its analysis by examining whether
the statutes were permissible under the police power.3 54 It then applied

the multi-factor inquiry.
339. Id. at 115-16; NEw YORK, N.Y., N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
340. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 115-17.
341. Id. at 129 ("[A]ppellants do not contest that New York City's objective ... is an
entirely permissible governmental goal. They also do not dispute that the restrictions imposed
on its parcel are appropriate means of securing the purposes of the. . . law.").
342. Id. at 135.
343. Id. at 136.
344. Id. at 136-37.
345. Id. at 137.
346. Id. at 138.
347. Id. at 149 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
348. Id. at 149 n. 13 ("Difficult conceptual and legal problems are posed by [the] rule.").
349. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
350. Id. at 54-55.
351. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1978).
352. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1978).
353. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 56.
354. Id. at 58 ("The prohibition. . . is fully consonant with the purposes of the Eagle
Protection Act. It was reasonable.").
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The Court stressed that the government did not appropriate the artifacts nor restrain plaintiffs' ability to possess them.355 It then addressed
the economic impact of the regulation. Although the regulations prevented plaintiffs' "most profitable use,"' 356 it was not clear that the statutes destroyed all "economic benefit. '357 The Court recognized that
courts are "not especially competent" to predict future profits, 358 but
nevertheless speculated that359these appellees could "exhibit the artifacts
for an admissions charge.
The Court did not analyze the reasonable investment-backed expectations factor. Prior to the regulations, appellees' trade was lawful. 3
Additionally, plaintiffs composed their artifacts before Congress enacted
the statutes.361 It therefore appears that plaintiffs had reasonable investment-backed expectations in selling their wares, especially the products
composed while the trade was lawful. Yet the Court did not address this
factor and instead focused on the regulatory nature of the law and the
fact that it allowed some possible profit for plaintiffs. The Court rejected
plaintiffs' taking claim. 62
One further case illustrates the Court's high standard for the economic impact factor in traditional regulatory cases. In Agins v. City of
Tiburon,36 3 plaintiffs purchased five acres of land in Tiburon, California.
Tiburon then adopted zoning ordinances that prohibited high density development of the parcel. 36 Plaintiffs challenged the zoning ordinance as
"facially 5 unconstitutional" under the Fifth Amendment Taking
36
Clause.
As in previous cases, the Court first determined that the statute
"substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals" under the police power.3 66 It also considered the character of the government's conduct and concluded that the law validly adjusted economic benefits and
burdens throughout the community. 367 The Court then addressed the
economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiffs. Although the ordinances limited development, plaintiffs could still build "as many as" five
355. Id. at 65.
356. Id. at 66.
357. See id. at 66 ("[it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit
from the artifacts.").
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 53-54.
361. Id. at 54.
362. Id. at 66-68.
363. 447 U.S. 255, 257 (1979).
364. Id. at 257.
365. Id. at 258.
366. Id. at 261.
367. Id. at 262; see supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
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single family homes on their five acre tract.3

68

503

The Court decided that no

taking occurred since plaintiffs could still exercise their development
rights to this limited extent.3 69
One additional basic idea emerges from the Court's most recent taking analysis. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,3 ° the Court stressed the
reasonable investment-backed expectation factor of the Penn Centralinquiry. In some previous decisions, the Court did not analyze this factor 37 1 or gave it only passing reference.3 72 But in Monsanto the Court
found this factor "so overwhelming" that it did not examine the economic impact or the governmental action factors.3 7 3
37
Plaintiff developed and produced pesticides.3 74 A federal statute 1
required Monsanto to submit health, safety and environmental data to
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") before its products could
be registered and marketed. 76 Monsanto contended that this information was valuable trade secret property and contested statutory provisions that required public disclosure of the information. 7 7 The United
States Supreme Court accepted Monsanto's argument as to some of the
information, but rejected it as to others.3 78
The Court ruled that Monsanto could have no reasonable investment-backed expectations in the data it submitted after the EPA enacted
the public disclosure provisions.3 79 The requirements were "rationally
related to a legitimate government interest" 8 0 and Monsanto had full
notice in advance.3 8 1 Since Monsanto chose to submit the data in exchange for its own economic advantage, the law could "hardly be called
368. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
369. Id. at 262-63.
370. 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1984).
371. See supra notes 305, 316-18, 360-62 and accompanying text.
372. In Penn Central, the Court stated that Penn Central's "primary expectation" concerning the parcel was its "present use" as a low rise terminal with commercial rental space, 438
U.S. at 136, despite the fact that Penn Central had already entered a lease worth $3,000,000
per year that it could not perform without building the office tower above the terminal. Id. at
116. In Agins, the Court stated that appellants were "free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations" although the zoning ordinance limited appellants' ability to improve its
parcel to five single family dwellings. 447 U.S. at 262.
373. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2875.
374. Id. at 2870.
375. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1975).
376. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2867.
377. Id. at 2871.
378. Id. at 2875.
379. Id. The Court accepted Monsanto's arguments as to trade secret property it submitted prior to the public disclosure requirements. Id. at 2877-79.
380. Id. at 2876.
381. Id. at 2875.
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3 82

a taking.
Monsanto is significant for two reasons. First, it exemplifies the
Court's selective approach to the Penn Central factors. Second, it
fleshes-out the reasonable investment-backed expectations factor. The
Court clearly tied this consideration to the property owners' advance notice of government restrictions on their property rights.
In summary, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court applies
the Penn Central factors selectively, and often in conjunction with police
power/due process principles. When the government appropriates or invades private property, the Court stresses the character of the governmental action factor. 8 3 In more traditional regulatory cases, like zoning
challenges, the Court stresses the economic impact factor.3 84 Finally, in
at least one recent case, the Court linked the reasonable investmentbacked expectation factor to notice and determined that it overwhelmed
the other Penn Central factors.3 85
c. Application of Penn Central to California's Program
Under Penn Centraland its descendants, the United States Supreme
Court has analyzed Taking Clause challenges in an ad hoc fashion. 86
The decisions reveal that due process considerations are often analyzed
under the takings rubric. In addition-despite the Court's effort to set a
multi-factor standard-the Court analyzes these factors selectively, depending on the underlying controversy. While it is difficult to predict the
Court's approach, examination of the Court's recent decisions indicate
that the California Program may constitute a taking.
(i) Due process inquiry
In Penn Centralthe Court recognized that takings occur when statutes are not reasonably related to permissible police power objectives.38 7
In Webb's, the Court applied this basic analysis and found that the interpleader statute had no "reasonable basis" and was not "reasonably related to the costs of using the courts. ' 38 8 The Carrollcourt should have
examined whether California's Program was permissible under the police
power, since it is an important aspect of taking analysis.38 9
It appears that the purpose of the Program, found in an express
382. Id. at 2876.
383. See supra notes 304-09, 319-35 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 336-69 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
386. Supra note 271.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 292-99.
388. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980). See supra
notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
389. In Carroll,the California Court of Appeal described the statute as a "regulation [that]
promotes the common good, even by adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life," but
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provision of the enabling legislation, 39° is a permissible police power objective. While funding legal aid programs to benefit the indigent may
raise ethical questions for the legal profession, 391 no one can seriously
contend that California may not provide legal services as part of its inherent police power to promote the general welfare.3 92

The more difficult inquiry is whether the Program bears a reasonable relationship to these laudable goals.39 3 The Program generates

funds; funds are needed to pay attorneys fees and court costs for those
persons unable to pay; therefore, the Program bears a reasonable rela-

tionship to the legitimate objectives of the statute. But this "syllogism"
is not valid. Any government program that creates income would bear a
reasonable relationship to virtually any permissible government goal.
did not explain its reasoning. Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1107,
209 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748 (1984).
390. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6210 (West Supp. 1985) ("It is the purpose of this article
to expand the availability and improve the quality of existing free legal services in civil matters
to indigent persons, and to initiate new programs that will provide services to them.").
391. Traditional ethical standards prohibit attorneys from benefitting in any way from the
investment of their clients' funds. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 991
(1967); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 545 (1962); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1980); CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8-101 (1984). Most funds generated under the Program ultimately will be received by
attorneys in the form of legal fees. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6216(b), 6218-6220 (West
Supp. 1985). Thus, California's Program and others like it appear to divert clients' property to
benefit attorneys. Cf. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 805 (1978) (Critics
); In
contend that "the proposal ... cast[s] a shadow of impropriety on the profession ....
re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 283 Ark. 252, 675 S.W.2d 355 (1984) (prohibiting
participating attorneys from acquiring earnings generated under the program and requiring
notice to clients that these attorneys will receive no interest).
The American Bar Association issued a formal ethics opinion that distinguishes program
participation from its previous ethics opinions on client trust funds. ABA Op. 348, supra note
19, at 1502. It proffers three major differences: 1) there is no conflict of interest between
lawyers' own financial interests and those of their clients; 2) there is public scrutiny and accountability in the state-authorized programs; and 3) there is no commingling between lawyers' and clients' funds under the programs. Id. at 1506.
While these differences are clearly valid, they do not address the most basic ethical contradictions created by the programs. There may be no conflict of interest between individual
attorneys and their clients, but the program clearly benefits the profession as a whole by paying
attorneys' fees with interest earned on clients' funds without clients' consent. There may be
public accountability and scrutiny, but the programs are administered by bar associations and
other attorney organizations-an apparent conflict of interest.
The programs allow the profession to fulfill its obligations to the poor without lowering
the increasingly high costs of legal services. These more comprehensive ethical considerations
have not been given adequate consideration by proponents of the programs. Cf. In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983) (rejecting proposed rule
requiring mandatory pro bono work by attorneys, while exhorting all bar members to participate in Florida's interest on trust account program).
392. See Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 353.
393. Id.
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For example, if the purpose of the legislation was to provide hospital
care for indigent leukemia victims, it certainly would be a legitimate police power objective. The Program, in that it generates income, would be
a rational means to carry out the purpose of the legislation since money
is critical to providing health care. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a government program that could not be implemented with funds generated
under the Program.
Professor John J. Costonis criticizes the reasonable relationship test
in the taking context.3 94 He believes it is fundamentally unfair to single
out individual property owners to bear the cost of public programs unless
there is a connection between the burdened property's use and the goal of
the legislation.3 95 This "use dependent" test determines whether the legislative decision is fair in principle. Applied to California's Program, the
test asks: is it fair to impose the burden of funding legal services for the
indigent on clients who forward nominal or short-term trust funds to
their attorneys?3 96 The test examines the relationship between the evil
the Program seeks to eradicate and the current use of the property.3 97
California would have to show that expanding the availability and improving the quality of existing free legal services to indigent persons3 98 is
linked so closely to the use of nominal or short-term client trust funds
that clients have not been unfairly singled out to pay for the program
without compensation.3 99 Clearly, when framed in this manner, the Program seems unreasonable.
As in Webb's, proponents of the Program have offered no police
power justification that shows a nexus between the use of the funds and
the purpose of the state's appropriation of the interest.' There is no
evidence that clients who advance nominal or short-term funds to their
attorneys have any reasonable relationship to the fact that poor Californians cannot afford legal counsel. Arguments, however, could be contrived. For example, proponents could assert that legal services are
beyond the means of the poor precisely because clients with money pay
394. Costonis, supra note 263, at 488.
395. Id. at 469.
396. See id. at 490.
397. Id. at 493.
398. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6210 (West Supp. 1982).
399. Costonis, supra note 263, at 487.
400. See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
One Commentator asserts that IOLTA programs are "closely connected to proper state
concerns." See Comment, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts: A Proposalfor Wisconsin, 66
MARQ. L. REV. 835, 850 (1983). He views goals of the legal profession such as keeping courts
accessible and providing representation for the poor as proper police power justifications for
the programs. See id. However, this view ignores the fact that clients' funds rather than
attorneys' funds are used to generate income for the programs. Cf. supra note 391. Additionally, this analysis shows no connection between client trust funds and the fact that indigents
cannot afford legal services.
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high prices. This argument creates a connection between clients who can
afford to forward trust funds to their attorneys and the high cost of legal
services. However, this reasoning breaks down when one considers that
the Program only applies to clients who forward nominal or short-term
funds." Whatever marketplace analogy could be devised, there is no
way to explain how only clients with nominal or short-term funds drive
up the price of legal counsel to the exclusion of the poor. It is not surprising that proponents of the Program have not attempted to link the
purposes of the Program and the use of clients' trust funds.
Whether the Supreme Court would undertake this more critical
analysis of the Program is uncertain. In Loretto, the Court rejected use
dependent arguments proffered by proponents of the regulation at issue." 2 However, in doing so, it expressed the use-dependent principle
that owners should not be singled out to bear losses unrelated to their use
of their property. 4 3 Furthermore, in Webb's the Court sought a police
power justification in the nexus between the cost of using the court registry and the deposited interpleader fund.'
Given the extraordinary nature of California's Program, the Court may be willing to examine
whether the Program is truly a reasonable means to effect its commendable purposes.
(ii) Multi-factor inquiry
The United States Supreme Court applies the three basic factors in
the multi-factor inquiry selectively. 4" It chooses factors based upon the
circumstances of the case. The California Program's constitutionality
depends upon which factors are utilized.
When government conduct invades or appropriates private prop4 6
erty, the Court stresses the character of the government action factor. 0

This emphasis is critical because the character of California's conduct
under its Program is strikingly similar to that of Florida in Webb's. In
401. This distinction was the basis for opponents' equal protection arguments in Carroll v.

State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1107, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748 (1984). The
Carrollcourt determined that the statute impaired "no fundamental interest," id. at 1108, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 749, and rejected plaintiffs' equal protection arguments. Id. at 1107-08, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 748-49.
402. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 438-39 & n.17.
403. The Court described the use dependency argument as proving "too much" since private property owners could be forced to devote space to third party vending machine operators
or to the government for governmental offices. Id. Professor Costonis describes the Court's
"parade of horribles" as establishing "the test's indispensability as a principled means of averting these results." Costonis, supra note 263, at 512. "Implicit in the Court's selection of hypotheticals is the sense . . . that, if it indiscriminately approved such claims, government
could single out property owners for losses that they should not be required to bear." Id.
404. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 300-85 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 305-09, 316-35 and accompanying text.
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both instances, the state appropriates the beneficial use of a privately
owned principal fund for itself. This conduct is not merely destruction of
property or regulatory adjustment of economic benefits and burdens." 7
The Program does not merely destroy clients' ability to control investment but takes this ability for state use.
If the Webb's rationale is strictly applied to California's Program,
the economic impact and reasonable investment-backed expectations factors will not be analyzed." 8 Since the Program is limited to small sums
or those held for short durations," 9 analysis of these factors could point
towards upholding the Program.
The character of California's action is also similar to that of the
government in Kaiser Aetna. The Program destroys clients' ability to
exclude others from enjoying their property.4 10 The Kaiser Court indicated that physical invasion went beyond mere regulation.4"1 Although
the economic harm in Kaiser was substantial, the Court highlighted the
character of the government's conduct and the significant nature of the
owner's property interest, rather than the value of the property. 4 12 Like
the government in Kaiser, the California Program appropriates private
property and forces property owners to allow the public to use it.
The Program is also similar to the cable television law challenged in
Loretto. Both statutes represent unusual police power regulations directed at important public interests. 41 3 The Loretto Court accepted the
statute's goals, but recoiled against its methods.4" 4 While it might not be
appropriate to create a per se rule to govern California's Program, as the
Supreme Court did to address New York's statute, the appropriative
character of California's conduct may be emphasized nonetheless. Since
the Supreme Court is especially sensitive to unusual police power regulations and stresses the character of the government action factor whenever
private property is taken for government use,415 it is probable that this
line of cases is applicable and that California's Program represents a
compensable taking.
It is less likely that the Program would be considered a traditional
police power regulation.41 6 In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has
stressed that the regulations adjusted economic benefits and burdens and
407. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.

408. See supra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
409. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.

410.
411.
412.
413.
text.
414.

Cf. supra text accompanying note 326.
See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 324.
Compare text accompanying notes 331-32 with notes 103, 390-92 and accompanying
See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.

415. Supra note 335 and accompanying text.

416. See generally supra notes 336-69 and accompanying text.
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did not appropriate private property. For example, in Penn Centralthe
Court found no exploitation of property for city purposes, 4 17 and in Andrus the Court emphasized that the government did not take possession
of the Indian artifacts.4 18
If the Supreme Court applied this line of cases to the Program, the
Program could be upheld. In these decisions, the Court stressed the economic impact factor of the multi-factor inquiry and required almost
complete destruction of economic benefit. Since California's Program is
limited to funds ostensibly unable to benefit their owners, 4 19 the Court
could find no taking.
However, commentators have identified a critical difference between
the Penn Central-type cases and trust account programs on this factor.42 0
The only way clients can profit from their principal funds is to invest
them.4 2 ' In Penn Central, the Court stressed that plaintiffs obtained a
"reasonable return" from their existing use of the Grand Central Terminal.42 2 Clients gain no economic benefit from the existing use of their
trust fund principal. In Agins, the regulation prohibited the most lucrative use of plaintiffs' parcel, but did not prevent all ability to profit from
it.42 California's Program, on the other hand, proscribes the only way
clients can profit from their trust funds.
Concededly, the regulation in Andrus completely abolished the appellees' ability to sell their wares, 424 just as California's Program completely abolishes not only clients' right to earn interest on nominal or
short-term funds, but also their ability to control whether their funds are
invested and to direct how the earnings are used.4 25 The Court in Andrus strained to find a way for appellees to still benefit, and speculated
that they could display the artifacts for an admissions fee.42 6 Although it

might be possible to discern a way for clients to profit from their trust
funds held pursuant to the California Program, it is unlikely. Since interest represents substantially all the value in possessing money, when the
interest is taken the value of the money in terms of economic benefit has
been destroyed.4 2 7 While clients may gain other benefits from their trust
funds,42 8 it appears that the Court's standard for the economic impact
417. Supra note 342 and accompanying text.

418.
419.
420.
421.

Supra note 355 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
See Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 363-64.
Id.

422. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136; supra note 343 and accompanying text.
423. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63; see supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
424. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 56; supra note 353 and accompanying text.
425. See generally supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
426. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66; see supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
427. Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 364.
428. The primary benefit clients gain from their trust funds is the safekeeping of their principal. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
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factor-complete denial of profit earning ability-has been met by California's Program. Thus, the economic impact factor of the Penn Central
inquiry could point to a taking on these facts.
Finally, the Court's most recent Taking Clause decision highlights
the reasonable investment-backed expectation factor as it relates to California's Program.42 9 In Monsanto, plaintiff could have no reasonable investment-backed expectations since it turned over secret trade
information with full knowledge that the government would disclose it to
the public.4 30 Notice was critical to the Court's decision that no taking
had occurred. While it is probable that clients had no investment-backed
expectations in their trust funds in the past, it is reasonable for them to
expect that once their funds are invested, they will receive the benefit.
Under the Monsanto rationale, if clients deposited trust funds with their
attorneys with full knowledge that their funds would be invested, and
that earnings on nominal or short-term funds would inure to the State
Bar's benefit, then clients could have no reasonable investment-backed
expectations in the interest. Under California's Program, clients have no
advance notice that their funds will be invested to benefit others.4 31 Arguably, clients' reasonable investment-backed expectations are thwarted
by California's Program under the Monsanto rationale.
d. Conclusion: Clients' Property Is Taken
Proponents of California's Program have characterized it as a valid
432
police power regulation that does not constitute a compensable taking.
While the Supreme Court has been unable to devise a "set formula" for
when a regulation constitutes a taking, it has analyzed police power principles and has used a multi-factor inquiry to make the determination.4 3 3
Other than the fact that it promotes a legitimate police power purpose,
analysis indicates that the California Program may take clients' property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
regulation of client trust funds is not reasonably related to the inadequacy of legal services for indigent persons in California.13' The Program completely abrogates the only means by which clients may gain an
economic benefit from their trust funds;4 35 and the character of the governmental action appropriates private property to fund public interest
legal assistance without notice to clients and without paying compensa429. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984); see supra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
430. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2875-76; see supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

See generally supra notes 77-107 and accompanying text.
Supra note 260 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 393-404 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 420-27.
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tion.4 36 The laudable purpose of California's Program should not sustain
it against a Taking Clause challenge.
D. The RemedyWhat remedy is available for the taking of clients' property
under the Program?
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from taking private property for public use; it merely prohibits this action absent
payment of "just compensation."4'37 In traditional eminent domain or
inverse condemnation4 38 cases, courts award just compensation whenever a taking is found.439 The payment standard is generally either the
value of the owner's loss, or that of the government's gain." 0 But neither
standard is applicable to takings that occur due to over-regulation.
Although Justice Holmes first formulated the concept that a police
power regulation could become a taking in 1922,"1 the Supreme Court
and the states' highest courts have never awarded compensation in these
cases."
Instead,
courts invalidate the legislation rather than award
443
compensation.
In 1980, the Court decided a case that may herald a change in this
dichotomy between regulatory takings and traditional takings. In San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego,4' a plurality determined that
regulatory takings must be compensated for the period that the regulation was in force." 5 This determination, however, is not yet the official
436. See supra notes 406-15, 429-31 and accompanying text.
437. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

438. The phrase 'inverse condemnation' generally describes a cause of action against a
government defendant in which a landowner may recover just compensation for a
'taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent domain have not
been instituted by the government entity.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
439. See, e.g., id. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]hejust compensation requirement in
the Fifth Amendment is not precatory."); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)
(The Fifth Amendment is "self-executing" with respect to compensation.); Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (A duty to pay is "imposed by the [Fifth] Amendment.").
440. See generally, Baker & Wood, supra note 1, at 365-66.
441. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
442. See Freilich, supra note 270, at 448.
443. Id.
444. 450 U.S. 621 (1980).
445. Id. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 270.
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view of the Court on this issue." 6
As the law stands currently, clients' remedy will be invalidation of
the Program rather than just compensation. Under Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 47 compensation is an improper remedy in California. Thus,
the Program would not survive a successful appeal of Carrollv. State Bar
of California"8 on the Taking Clause issue.

Conclusion
California's Legal Services Trust Account Program is based on a
concept first introduced in this country by the Florida Bar Association." 9 Under the Program, California attorneys must4 5 abandon their
traditional trust account practice, which was to commingle numerous
clients' funds in single, non-interest-bearing checking accounts.4 5 1 The
Program requires attorneys to invest all nominal funds or those that the
attorney will hold for short periods, for the benefit of the State of California Bar Association. 45 2 The Bar, in turn, distributes the funds to legal
aid centers that service the impoverished.4 53 While the concept is laudable and the means have generated over $12,000,000 since the Program
became operational in March of 1983, 5 1 the Program may violate the
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The argument that clients have no property rights in the interest is
unlikely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The United States
Supreme Court decision of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith455 established that states may not take interest earned on a private
principal fund--either by mandating that interest be earned 4 56 or by
446. Professor Freilich identifies several cases nationwide that have cited the Brennan dissent rather than await a majority opinion on this issue. See Freilich, supra note 270, at 450
n.12.
Recently, plaintiffs in a California inverse condemnation action claimed compensation for
a regulatory taking citing San Diego Gas. Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138
Cal. App. 3d 484, 492, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 (1982). The Court of Appeals rejected the
argument, stating: "While the United States Supreme Court may eventually conclude that
California cannot limit the remedy available for a taking to non-monetary relief, it has not yet
done so. . . ." Id. at 494, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 196. The California rule under Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 278, 598 P.2d 25, 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 379 (1979) is that compensation for a regulatory taking is unavailable.
447. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affid 447 U.S. 255 (1979).

448. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984).
449. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.

450. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
451. See generally supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.

453. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.

455. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
456. See supra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.

Spring 1985]

CALIFORNIA'S TRUST ACCOUNT PROGRAM

513

redefining the property.4 57 Additionally, traditional property formulations have45recognized
that the legal right to use property is itself a prop8
erty right.
The California Program's proponents have argued that it constitutes
a valid police power regulation that legitimately impairs economic values. Although the law in this area is uncertain,4 59 the Court's recent
Taking Clause decisions indicate the applicable considerations.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,"6 the Court
stated that regulations "will be analyzed ' 46 1 under a multi-factor inquiry
first articulated in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York.4 62 California's Program may be unable to withstand this analysis since it completely abrogates clients' ability to gain an economic benefit from their
principal.4 63 In addition, the Program transfers the economic benefit
from private owners to the state without just compensation. 4 64 When
clients have no notice that interest generated on their principal will benefit others, it is reasonable for them to expect to receive that interest.4 65
Finally, the Program's regulation of clients' funds may not be reasonably
related to its purpose of expanding and improving free legal services to
the poor.46 6
The trust account concept is innovative 4 67 and effective. 468 Its constitutional difficulties under the Taking Clause could be eliminated by
restoring notice and client control over the investment.4 69 While these
features may create destructive precedent for the IRS,47 ° further validation of the present California Program under the United States Constitution will create destructive precedent of Constitutional proportions. The
praiseworthy purpose and effect of California's Legal Services Trust Account Program do not and cannot override the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
457. See supra notes 237-51 and accompanying text.

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 271.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Id. at 440.
438 U.S. 104 (1977).
See supra notes 420-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 406-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 429-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 387-404 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-50, 114-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-50, 114-18 and accompanying text; see also In re Interest on Law-

yers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., writing separately) (IRS
administrative complications insufficient justification for approving program that does not require client consent).
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Over sixty years ago, Justice Holmes warned that even the most
laudable public interest goals do not substitute for constitutional procedures.4 71 California's Legal Services Trust Account Program, may exemplify a public interest program that is "too good to be true" for
constitutional requirements.47 2

471. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutinal
way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
472. See supra text accompanying note 6.

